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Abstract
The widely applied cloud has brought the rapid increase in digital data. In spite that the
internet services are widely adopted in the daily life, cloud clients take a great concern
to security and privacy of their digital data because of losing the direct control of their
data managed by the cloud server. Security and privacy become significant barriers to
the spread of various internet technologies, such as cloud computing and cloud storage.
To protect the data privacy, cloud clients can upload their data in the encrypted form.
However, this creates a barrier for data classification and search operations. Testing if two
ciphertexts contain the same plaintext is a promising approach to address the problem. It
implies that the clients can query if the plaintext embedded in a ciphertext is equal to
that in the queried ciphertext without decryption. Although it is not hard to achieve with
cryptography, the security against the insider attack (by the cloud server) is challenging.
In addition to ensuring data privacy while allowing searching and classification using
advanced encryption, the integrity of (possibly encrypted) data is another critical security
issue that must be well addressed. For ensuring data integrity, the cloud clients can adopt
cryptographic protocols such as proof of storage (PoS) which enables a cloud storage
provider to prove that a client’s data is intact. However, the existing PoS protocols are
not designed for the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) business model in which payment is made
based on both storage volume and duration. Moreover, none of the existing works have
considered the condition that the clients make any changes to storage duration. The data
privacy and integrity issues in the above scenarios are the main concerns in cloud storage,
since the attacker including the cloud server has incentive to learn the data content or
cover up data loss accidents. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt practical privacy-preserving
methodologies to address privacy and integrity concerns in the cloud.
In this thesis, we propose a novel equality test scheme aiming to solve the problem
of equality test over ciphertext. Our scheme adopts the identity-based approach to make
the solution more practical. To further ensure the integrity of cloud data, which can be
first encrypted using our identity-based encryption with equality test, we propose crypto-
graphic protocols suitable for the novel PAYG payment model to address the problems of
data integrity checking in the cloud. The first protocol is time encapsulated that ensures
the original file can be retrived after successful auditing by a client. The second protocol
is a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol that allows a third-party auditor (TPA) to
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audit outsourced data on behalf of its clients without sacrificing the data or the timestamp
(i.e., time of storage). We also suggest a data integrity checking scheme to simultane-
ously check the data content and storage duration represented by an updatable timestamp
with strong privacy against TPA. All the aforementioned works are with provable secu-
rity based on the intractability of some computationally hard problems. We compare our
works with the existing significant works in order to analyze their efficiency in practice.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The advances of network technologies along with the increasing demand on computing
and storage resources by many organizations and individuals have promoted the outsourc-
ing of computing and storage services. The commercial computing model is referred to
as “cloud computing” built on the cloud infrastructures. There are many types of cloud
services, such as:
• infrastructure as a service (IaaS), where a customer makes use of a service provider’s
computing, storage, or networking infrastructure.
• platform as a service (PaaS), where a customer leverages the provider’s resources
to run custom applications.
• software as a service (SaaS), where customers use software that is run on the
provider’s infrastructure.
The cloud infrastructures are commonly categorized to be private and public. In a private
cloud, the infrastructure is in the client’s control, which means being managed and owned
by the client and located on-premise. Particularly, the client’s data is under its control
and is only granted to trusted parties. In a public cloud, the infrastructure is owned and
managed by a cloud service provider (CSP) and is located off-premise. The client’s data
is no longer under its control and could potentially be granted to untrusted parties [46].
The cloud computing innovates a change on how to deal with the data. It also brings some
challenge to the security of data in the cloud.
The cloud data protection approaches are commonly following the standard principle
called “CIA” which is to protect the confidentiality of data, preserve the integrity of data,
and provide the availability of data for authorized use. More precisely, the three security
requirements are as follows:
Confidentiality ensures that sensitive data is accessed only by an authorized party and
kept away from those not authorized to possess them. It is implemented using security
mechanisms such as access control and encryption.
1
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Integrity ensures that data are in a format that is true and correct to its original purposes.
The data can be edited by authorized parties only and remains in its original state. In-
tegrity is implemented using a security mechanism such as data integrity checking.
Availability ensures that the data and resources are available to those who need them.
It is implemented using methods such as hardware maintenance, software patching, and
network optimization. Processes such as redundancy [3], failover [65], RAID [76], and
high-availability clusters [43] are used to mitigate serious consequences when hardware
issues occur.
Cryptography is the de facto solution to protect data confidentiality and integrity. Com-
pared with symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography is more versatile in
terms of functionality and special features. This thesis focuses on public key crypto-
graphic approaches for protecting cloud data confidentiality and integrity.
1.1 Background
The cloud platform provides some great features [38]. It allows on-demand access to the
outsourced data and enables the clients to pay for what they use, such as virtual hard-
ware, software, and services. It costs low management overhead and provides immediate
access to applications through the network, rather than having them locally. Cloud secu-
rity is a major obstacle that hinders the wide adoption of cloud computing in real-world
applications. In cloud security, the confidentiality and integrity of the outsourcing data
are the fundamental security requirements that have attracted a considerable amount of
attention. Privacy means that the data is only accessible to authorized users. Integrity
means the data in the cloud are intact. Considering different scenarios, there are many
cryptographic approaches with distinctive features proposed, such as identity-based en-
cryption [13], public-key encryption with equality test [82], proofs of retrievability [59],
and provable data possession [5]. Considering the fundamental utility of the encrypted
data in the cloud storage, it is highly desirable to deploy efficient encryption with equality
test functionality to realize the classification or keyword searching among the encrypted
client’s data [66]. Meanwhile, since encryption does not provide any integrity protec-
tion, additional mechanisms for protecting (possibly encrypted) data from unauthorized
modification is also essential for cloud security. However, we should make sure that the
integrity protection mechanism would not harm the data privacy. Thus, we also consider
the data privacy of the data integrity approaches, since it is critical to deploy efficient au-
diting as accountability mechanisms that monitor the utilization of data records and track
the provenance to ensure the integrity of the stored data.
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Table 1.1: The Prior Arts with Our Schemes
Equality Test with Data Privacy Insider Attack Security
[82] × OW-CCA
[69] × OW/IND-CCA
[70] × OW/IND-CCA
[41] × OW/IND-CCA
[53] × OW/IND-CCA
[51] × OW-ID-CCA
section 3.5
√
W-IND-ID-CCA
Data Integrity Scheme Retrievable Privacy-Preserving Timestamp
[59]
√
× ×
[73] ×
√
×
[28] ×
√
×
section 4.5
√
×
√
section 4.7 ×
√ √
section 5.5 ×
√ √
1.1.1 Cryptographic Solutions for Cloud Storage
Various research works such as searchable encryption, broadcast encryption, and attribute-
based encryption, predict encryption to protect client’s data stored in the cloud. Particu-
larly, the probabilistic public-key encryption with equality test (PKEET) [82] is an excit-
ing technique with broad applications such as in outsourced database systems, which host
and manage encrypted data for users. The merit of the equality test scheme is that one
can check whether two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext without decrypting them. In
the original equality test scheme [82], outsourced database servers are usually considered
semi-trusted because of their curiosity about user data. We call it an “Honest but Curious”
(HBC) server. It is practical for the server to obtain the illegal profit from peddling user’s
private data by simple brute force attacks on the encrypted message. In the cloud environ-
ment, assume that the adversary can access all ciphertexts and test their equality, which is
called “insider attack” [54]. It indicates that such HBC server (the insider), who runs the
test algorithm correctly and continuously, can perform any polynomial-time computation
and obtain the information beyond its own. In a real-world application, the insider at-
tack should be resisted by the encryption scheme deployed over the client’s data since the
cloud server is not fully trusted. On the other hand, another major cloud security issue
is the integrity of the outsourced data since the clients do not possess it locally. In 2019,
there is a report shows that Microsoft concerns the possible risk of data lossa. In 2020,
another report claims that the cloud is not exempt from technology failure or human er-
aIs Cloud Storage Data Loss Possible? According to Microsoft, Yes It Is. URL: https:
//weareproactive.com/cloud-storage-data-loss-is-possible.
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rorb. Meanwhile, the cloud service provider (CSP) may try to hide data loss or corruption
due to accidents or cyber attacks. It will cover the data loss to maintain a reputation [29].
Thus, it is crucial to deploy periodical integrity checking mechanisms over the outsourced
data to ensure its integrity and freshness [24].
Proof of storage (PoS) is a generic primitive that allows a party to verify that the prover
stores a file intact [6]. There are two popular PoS models, provable data possession (PDP)
[5, 7, 9, 27, 28, 48, 73, 77, 79] and proof of retrievability (PoR) [16, 45, 59, 61], each has
its pros and cons. PDP allows a user to store data at an untrusted server to verify that the
server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic
proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks. PoR ensures that a user can
recover the entire file when auditing is successful and is considered to be more robust than
PDP model for remote data integrity checking (RDIC) in the cloud. However, considering
the large size of outsourced data and the client’s constraint on local storage capability, it is
desirable to implement a public auditing protocol in which integrity checking is performed
by a third-party auditor (TPA) while without revealing the outsourcing data during the
auditing process.
To impel cloud services like public utilities such as water, gas, and electricity, it is ideal
for running the PAYG business model in which a client pays CSP based on the storage
volume and storage duration, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. It means a cloud client can
update its files stored in the cloud on different dates, and the CSP will calculate the cloud
storage fee for each day according to the total volume occupied by the client on that day.
Under such a business model, a full-fledged PoS scheme should simultaneously pro-
vide the data integrity and timestamp validation. Moreover, it should also support the
efficient renewal of the storage service by updating the timestamp. However, the pre-
vious works only allow a party to verify the content integrity of the outsourced data
[6, 5, 7, 9, 27, 28, 48, 73, 77, 79]. The trivial solution is that the CSP sends the timestamp
to the verifier for verification. However, it has the drawback that the timestamp has to be
revealed to the verifier and is not suitable in the third party auditing setting where the TPA
should not learn any information about the data storage including the timestamp to avoid
any inference attacks that may be performed by the TPA to infer the data content. More-
over, it is a challenging problem to change their storage duration by updating timestamp
efficiently. The trivial solution is to compute new authenticators with the new timestamp.
However, the client has to download all the data to update the authenticators, which is im-
practical. Also, to reduce the computation burden on the client’s side, it is ideal to allow
the CSP to update the authenticators for the new timestamp.
bWhat are the chances of losing information in cloud storage? URL:
https://www.marconet.com/blog/what-are-the-chances-of-losing-information-in-cloud-storage.
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of the difference between the traditional payment and the ideal
payment: the financial cost is computed by the size of the shaded area.
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1.2 Contribution of This Thesis
In this thesis, we put our efforts into the cryptographic solutions to protect the aforemen-
tioned privacy issues with a formal security proof. The main contributions of this thesis
are as follows:
1. To address the aformentioned problem of equality test over the ciphertext in the
cloud storage, we propose an efficient identity-based equality test scheme (IBEET)
against the insider attack. We define a novel security model, as Weak-IND-ID-CCA
(W-IND-ID-CCA), for the confidentiality of IBEET, which allows the adversary to
conduct the equality test on all ciphertexts but can not generate ciphertexts. Also, it
is more robust than security models for previous works under the same attack.
2. To address the aformentioned problem of data integrity checking in the cloud stor-
age, we first present a PoR protocol that allows a user to verify the integrity of data
and its timestamp and ensures retrievability of the data upon successful auditing.
Then, we propose a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol in which a TPA
can efficiently verify the integrity of outsourced data and the timestamp while no
information on the content or the timestamp is leaked to the TPA. We show that
both protocols are sound, and are able to detect the modification or absence of the
outsourced data with overwhelming probability. We prove the security properties
formally against the algebraic adversaries [42, 47] with a random oracle.
3. None of the existing works have considered the user’s control over changes in stor-
age duration, that the user can change the timestamp to extend the contract or ter-
minate the contract at any time. Trivially, the user will conduct the entire protocol
once the timestamp is updated, which costs too much computation and commu-
nication resources compared to the scheme with timestamp update functionality.
Therefore, we propose a RDIC scheme to simultaneously check the data content
and storage duration represented by an updatable timestamp via the third-party au-
ditor (TPA). Also, our proposed scheme achieves indistinguishable privacy (IND-
privacy) against TPA for both data content and timestamp. To bind the content
and timestamp in the authenticator and support efficient timestamp update, we con-
struct the authenticator with the randomizable structure-preserving signature (SPS).
Additionally, we utilize the Groth-Sahai proof and range proof to provide the IND-
privacy and guarantee the timestamp validation in the auditing phase.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
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In Chapter 2, we review the preliminaries required in this thesis. We introduce the
algebra concepts, including group, ring, field, elliptic curve, and bilinear group. Then, we
present the complexity assumptions required in this thesis. Furthermore, we present some
cryptographic primitives, including PKE, IBE, PKEET, digital signature, and structure-
preserving signature.
In Chapter 3, we develop identity-based encryption with equality test, which is secure
against insider attack. We introduce the background of public-key encryption with equal-
ity test and the challenge from HBC cloud server towards the existing encryption schemes
with equality test, which we define as an insider attack. Then, we propose novel identity-
based encryption with equality test, which is secure against the insider attack. Finally, we
prove the security of our proposed scheme.
In Chapter 4, we propose two proof of storage schemes in PoR model and PDP model,
respectively, which is designed to satisfy the PAYG business model. We review the moti-
vation of the data integrity and challenges to the existing schemes when they are applied
to the novel business model. Both two types PoS schemes are proven sound with strong
privacy.
In Chapter 5, we propose IND-privacy remote data integrity checking scheme, which
is designed to complete the data integrity checking mechanism under the PAYG business
model. We review the challenges to the existing schemes that the contract update and
weak privacy protection. Then, we give a RDIC scheme with IND-privacy, which sup-
ports the contract update by updating the binding timestamp. Finally, we formally prove
the soundness and privacy of our proposed novel RDIC scheme.
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Preliminary
2.1 Miscellaneous Notions
Table 2.1: The Miscellaneous Notions in This Thesis
G Group
R Ring
F Field
E Elliptic Curve
Z Integer Group
0G Zero element of group
1G Identity element of group
|G| Order of group
0R Additive identity element of ring
1R Multiplicative identity element of ring
2.2 Foundation of Algebra
2.2.1 Abelian Group
We introduce the notion of an abelian group [64], which models many different algebraic
structures.
Definition 1. An abelian group is a set G together with a binary operation ? on G such
that:
• Associative. For all a,b,c ∈G, a? (b? c) = (a?b)? c.
• Identity Element. There exists 1G ∈G, such that for all a ∈Ga?1G = a = 1G ?a.
• Inverse. For all a ∈G, there exists a′ ∈G such that a?a′ = a′ ?a.
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• Communicative. For all a,b ∈G, a?b = b?a.
An abelian group G may be infinite or finite: if the group is finite, we define its order to
be the number of elements in the underlying set G; otherwise, we say that the group has
infinite order.
Theorem 1. If G is an abelian group of prime order, then G is cycle.
Proof. Let |G| = p be prime. Let a ∈ G with a 6= 0G, and let k be the order of a. As the
order of an element divides the order of the group, we have k|p, and so k = 1G or k = p.
Since a 6= 0G, we must have k 6= 1G, and so k = p, which implies that a generates G.
2.2.2 Ring
This part introduces the notion of a commutative ring with unity [64]. A ring is an alge-
braic structure with addition and multiplication operations.
Definition 2. A communicative ring with unity is a set R together with addition and
multiplication operations on R, such that:
• The set R under addition forms an abelian group, and we denote the additive identity
by 0R.
• Multiplication is associative. For all a,b,c ∈G, we have a(bc) = (ab)c.
• Multiplication distributes over addition. For all a,b,c ∈ R, we have a(b+ c) =
ab+ac and (b+ c)a = ba+ ca.
• There exists a multiplicative identity. There exists an element 1R ∈R, such that for
all a ∈ R, 1R ·a = a = a ·1R.
• Multiplication is communicative. For all a,b ∈ R, we have ab = ba.
If a and b are non-zero elements of R such that ab = 0, then a and b are called zero
divisors.
The cancellation law is that if R is a ring, and ab,b,c ∈ R such that a 6= 0 and a is not
a zero divisor, then ab = ac implies b = c.
2.2.3 Finite Field
We introduce the basic theory of finite fields [64]. If a non-trivial ring has no zero divisors,
then it is called an integral domain. Every finite integral domain is a field. Every finite
field F must be of cardinality pw, where p is prime, w is a positive integer, and p is the
characteristic of F.
• for every prime p and positive integer w, there exists a finite field of cardinality pw.
• any two finite fields of the same cardinality are isomorphic.
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2.2.4 Elliptic Curves [55]
Let F be a finite field and F̂ its algebraic closure. An elliptic curve over F is defined by a
Weierstrass equation
E/F : y2 +a1xy+a3y = x3 +a2x2 +a4x+a6, a1,a2,a3,a4,a6 ∈ F,
where there are no “singular points”. If L⊃ F, the set of L-rational points on E is
EL= (x,y) ∈ L×L : y2 +a1xy+a3y = x3 +a2x2 +a4x+a6∪{O},
where O is a special point, called the point at infinity. If L ⊃ F, we have that EL ⊃ EF.
We denote EF̂ by E. Simplified Weierstrass equation is as follows.
Case 1: If char(F) 6= 2,3, the simplified equation is y2 = x3 + ax+ b,a,b ∈ F and 4a3 +
27b2 6= 0.
Case 2: If char(F) = 2, the simplified equation is
y2 + xy = x3 +ax2 +b,a,b ∈ F,b 6= 0,non− supersingular,or
y2 + cy = x3 +ax2 +b,a,b,c ∈ F,c 6= 0,supersingular.
For any L ⊃ F, the set F(L) is an abelian group under the “chord-and-tangent law”.
Consider E/F : y2 = x3 +ax+b. The addition formulas are
1. P+O = O +P = P, for all P ∈ E(L).
2. −O = O .
3. If P = (x,y) ∈ E(L), we have −P = (x,−y).
4. If Q =−P, we have P+Q = O .
5. If P = (x1,y1),Q = (x2,y2) ∈ E(L), P 6= −Q, we have P + Q = (x3,y3), where
x3 = λ 2− x1− x2,y3 = λ (x1− x3)− y1, and
λ =
y2− y1
x2− x1
, P 6= Q,
λ =
3x21−a
2y1
, P = Q.
For cryptographic purpose, the finite field with order p is represented as Fp where p = qm,
m odd and F̂= ∪m≥1Fqm . The structure of elliptic curve groups is as follows.
1. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Then E(Fq) ∼= Zn1 ⊕Zn2 , where n2|n1
and n2|(q−1).
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2. E(Fq) is cyclic iff n2 = 1.
3. P ∈ E is an n-torsion point if nP = O and E[n] is the set of all n-torsion points.
4. If gcd(n,q) = 1, we have E[n]∼= Zn⊕Zn.
2.2.5 Bilinear Group
Definition 3 (Bilinear Group [32]). G1, G2 and GT constitute a bilinear group if there
exists a bilinear map e : G1×G2→GT , where |G1|= |G2|= |GT |= p.
The bilinear pairing is an operation conducted on bilinear groups. Informally, two
elements in such group are linearly related to the pairing result. The formal description
of the bilinear paring is given as follows.
Suppose that G1, G2 and GT are three cyclic groups with the same prime order p.
Suppose that g and h are generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear pairing e :
G1×G2→GT holds properties as follows:
1. Bilinearity: For any x ∈G1, y ∈G2 and a,b ∈ Z∗p, e(xa,yb) = e(x,y)ab.
2. Non-degeneration: e(g,h) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the generator of GT .
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(x,y), for any x ∈
G1 and y ∈G2.
2.2.6 Bilinear Map
We say that a pairing is symmetric if G1 =G2. Otherwise, it is asymmetric. In asymmetric
pairing, there are two types depending on whether there is an isomorphism from G2 to
G1.
• Type-1: This is the symmetric pairing setting in which G1 =G2;
• Type-2: If G1 6=G2, there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G2→G1.
• Type-3: If G1 6=G2, but there is no known efficiently computable isomorphism.
2.2.7 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 4 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Given h ∈ G to compute x such that
h = gx. Given an algorithm to generate the group as G , we define the following distribu-
tion
G := (q,G,g)← G ,
h←G.
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We assume that for any PPT algorithm A ,
AdvDLA (λ ) := Pr[x←A (h)]
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Definition 5 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G1 (DDH1)). Given g1,ga1,g
b
1,g
c
1 ∈
G1 where a,b,c ∈ Zq to decide whether gc1 = gab1 . Given an algorithm to generate the
group as G , we define the following advantage
G := (q,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2,e)← G ,
a,b,c← Zq,
D := (G;g1,g2,ga1,gb1).
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0,1}),
AdvDDHA (λ ) := |Pr[A (D,gab1 )]−Pr[A (D,gc1)]|
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
The dual of above assumption is Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption G2 denoted as
DDH2, which is identical to Definition 5 with the roles of G1 and G2 reversed.
Definition 6 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH)). The Symmetric
External Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
is intractable in both groups G1 and G2.
Definition 7 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH)). Given ga,gb ∈G to com-
pute gab. Given an algorithm to generate the group as G, we define the following advan-
tage
G := (q,G,g)← G ,
a,b ∈ Zq.
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A ,
AdvCDHA (λ ) := Pr[g
ab←A (ga,gb)]
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Definition 8 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH)). Given gai ,g
b
j and g
c
k, compute
e(g1,g2)abc, where i, j,k ∈ {1,2}. Given an algorithm to generate the group as G , we
define the following advantage
G := (q,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2,e)← G ,
gai ,g
b
j ,g
c
k, i, j,k ∈ {1,2},
a,b,c ∈ Zq.
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We assume that for any PPT algorithm A ,
AdvBDHA (λ ) := Pr[e(g1,g2)
abc←A (gai ,gbj ,gck, i, j,k ∈ {1,2})]
is neligible in the security parameter λ .
Definition 9 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)). Given gai ,g
b
j ,g
c
k and
e(g1,g2)z determine whethere(g1,g2)abc = e(g1,g2)z, where i, j,k ∈ {1,2}. Given an al-
gorithm to generate the group as G , we define the following distribution
G := (q,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2,e)← G ,
a,b,c,z ∈ Zq,
D := (G;g1,g2,gai ,gbj ,gck, i, j,k ∈ {1,2}).
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0,1}),
AdvDBDHA (λ ) := |Pr[A (D,e(g1,g2)abc)]−Pr[A (D,e(g1,g2)z)]|
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Definition 10 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem (q-SDH)). Given ga,ga2, · · · ,gaq ∈G to
find w ∈ Fq and g
1
a+w . Given an algorithm to generate the group as A , we define the
following advantage
G := (q,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2,e)← G ,
a,w ∈ Zq.
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A ,
Advq−SDHA (λ ) := Pr[g
1
a+w ←A (ga,ga
2
, · · · ,ga
q
∈G)]
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
Definition 11 (Double Pairing Problem (DP) [39]). Given gR,gT ∈ G1, compute non-
trivial R,T ∈ G2 satisfying e(gR,R)e(gT ,T ) = 1. Given an algorithm to generate the
group as G , we define the following advantage
G := (q,G1,G2,GT ,g1,g2,e)← G ,
gR,gT ∈G1.
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A ,
AdvDPA (λ ) := Pr[(R,T ∈G2)←A (gR,gT ∈G1)]
is negligible in the security parameter λ .
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2.3 Cryptographic Tools
Definition 12 (Collision Resistant Hash Function (CRHF) [26]). A family of functions
HI = hi : {0,1}∗→{0,1}ni∈I for a set of indexes I, is a family of collision resistant hash
functions (CRHFs) if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Efficient Generator: there exists an efficient algorithm that randomly picks a func-
tion hi from the family HI .
• Compression: the domain of the hash function is always larger than 2n, i.e the size
of the co-domain.
• Efficient Evaluation: there exists an efficient evaluating algorithm that on input i,x
computes hi(x).
• Collision resistance: it is hard for any efficient algorithm to find two values of the
domain x1,x2 such that x1 6= x2 and hi(x1) = hi(x2), for a randomly chosen i ∈ I.
Hash functions are widely used in cryptography. For example,
• In digital signature, hash functions are generally used for generating message fin-
gerprint, to add certain verifiable recognizable information.
• In public-key encryption system, hash functions are widely used for realizing a
ciphertext correctness verification mechanism to achieve a provable security against
attackers.
Definition 13 (Random Oracle (RO) [26]). A random oracle is a random function from
the domain X = {0,1}∗ of all bit strings into a co-domain Y of fixed size.
A random oracle can be simulated cryptographic hash functions in heuristic insight in
PPT. However, the random oracle is an ideal assumption, which does not exist in the real
world. Frequently, the generic group model (GGM) is used to prove the newly introduced
hardness assumptions.
Definition 14 (Generic Group Model (GGM) [62]). Let Zn be the additive group of inte-
gers mod n, and let S be a set of bit strings of cardinality at least n. An encoding function
of Zn on S is an injective map f from Zn into S. A generic algorithm A for Zn on S is a
probabilistic algorithm that behaves as follows:
1 It takes as input an encoding list f (x1), · · · , f (xk), where each xi ∈ Zn.
2 It may consult an oracle, specifying two indices i and j into the encoding list, and a
sign bit. The oracle computes f (xi± x j), according to the specific sign bit, this bit
string is appended to the encoding list.
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3 The output of A is a bit string denoted A( f ;x1, · · · ,xk).
Algebraic group model is also called “semi generic group model”, which allow the reduc-
tion to the existing complexity assumptions.
Definition 15 (Algebraic Group Model (AGM) [30]). Let G be a cyclic group of prime
order p. An algebraic algorithm AAlg if it behaves as follows:
1 It takes as input a group element list L1, · · · ,Lk, where each Li ∈G.
2 It outputs a group element Z ∈G. It also outputs a “representation”~z=(z1, · · · ,zt)∈
Zp such that Z = ∏i L
zi
i . This group element and its representation are appended to
the encoding list.
2.3.1 Public Key Encryption
Encryption is a conventional cryptographic approach to protect the privacy of message.
There are two classifications as symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryp-
tion. In the symmetric key encryption, the user holds a secret key used for encrypting
the message and decrypting the ciphertext. The problem of symmetric key encryption is
the receiver has to share the secret key to the sender, when the sender tries to send the
message to the receiver (secret key holder) using the encryption. The asymmetric key
encryption solves the aforementioned problem by distributing a pair of public/private key
to each user. The public key is published to the sender for encryption. The private key is
kept by the receiver for decryption. The public key generation of public-key systems is
Figure 2.1: The procedure of symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption.
The secret key of the receiver is both used to encrypt messages and decrypt the message
in the symmetric key encryption setting. However, in asymmetric key encryption, the
public key of the receiver is used to encrypt a message. The private key is kept by the
receiver privately for decrypting the ciphertext.
as Figure 2.2 Since the invention of public-key systems by Diffie and Hellman [25], al-
most all public-key encryption schemes are based on the computationally hard problems.
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Figure 2.2: This is the key generation of the public key system. The public key of the
receiver (to encrypt in order to protect the privacy of a message) is computed by the
private key of each user for decryption.
In the following part, we will review some typical and significant works on public-key
encryption.
Syntactically, an encryption can be defined as follows [80].
Definition 16. An encryption scheme consists of the following:
• a plaintext message space M : a set of strings over some alphabet
• a ciphertext message space C : a set of possible ciphertext messages
• an encryption key space K : a set of possible encryption keys
• a decryption key space K ′: a set of possible decryption keys
• an efficient set up algorithm Setup: N → pp
• an efficient key generation algorithm Key Generation: pp→K ×K ′
• an efficient encryption algorithm Encryption: M ×K → C
• an efficient decryption algorithm Decryption: C ×K ′→M
The security of an encryption system is defined by an attack. There are three modes to
be used in analysis of encryption system.
Definition 17 (Attacks on Encryption System [80]). The usual modes are on active at-
tacker as follows.
Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) An attacker chooses plaintext message and gets
encryption assistance to obtain the corresponding ciphertext message. The task
for the attacker is to weaken the targeted encryption system using the obtained
plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) An attacker chooses ciphertext messages and
gets decryption assistance to obtain the corresponding plaintext messages. The
task for the attacker is to weaken the targeted encryption system using the obtained
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The attacker is successful if it can retrieve some secret
plaintext information from a “target ciphertext” which is given to the attacker after
the decryption assistance is stopped. That is, upon the attacker receipt of the target
ciphertext, the decryption assistance is no longer available.
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Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2) This is a CCA where the decryption
assistance for the targeted encryption system will be available forever, except for
the target ciphertext.
First, we review the classical El Gamal encryption [33]. The El Gamal encryption is
derived from the Diffie-Hellman key distribution. Let xA as the secret of A, and xB as the
secret of B. Let p be a large prime and g be the primitive element mod p.
A B
xA xB
Compute
yA = gxA
yA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute
yB = gxB
yAB = y
xB
A
yB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Compute
yAB = y
xA
B
Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution
The El Gamal encryption is chosen-plaintext attack secure based on the discrete loga-
rithm problem. The interaction of El Gamal encryption is conducted between sender and
receiver. Let (xB,yB) as the public/private key pair of B, where yB = gxB .
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A B
yB xB,yB
Randomly choose
k
Compute
K = ykB
c1 = gk
c2 = Km mod p
C=(c1,c2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute
K = cxB1
m = c2/K
El Gamal Encryption
An improved public key encryption is Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [22]. In this work,
authors prove the security of their proposed scheme in the adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack under the DDH problem. The scheme is conducted as follows. Let p be a large
prime. We assume we have a group G with prime order p. Use a universal one-way family
of hash functions that map long bit strings to elements of Zp.
• Key Generation. Randomly choose g1,g2 ∈ G, and x1,x2,y1,y2,z ∈ Zp. Next,
compute
c = gx11 g
x2
2 ,d = g
y1
1 g
y2
2 ,h = g
z
1.
Choose hash function H from a universal one-way family of hash functions.
The public key is (g1,g2,c,d,h,H). The private key is (x1,x2,y1,y2,z).
• Encryption. Given a message m ∈ G, it chooses r ∈ Zp at random. Then, it
computes
u1 = gr1,u2 = g
r
2,e = h
rm,α = H(u1,u2,e),v = crdrα .
The ciphertext is (u1,u2,e,v).
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext (u1,u2,e,v), it computes α = H(u1,u2,e). And
test if
ux1+y1α1 u
x2+y2α
2 = v.
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If the condition does not hold, it outputs “reject”; otherwise, it outputs m =
e/uz1.
Since u1 = gr1,u2 = g
r
2, we have
ux11 u
x2
2 = g
rx1
1 g
rx2
2 = c
r, uy11 u
y2
2 = g
ry1
1 g
ry2
2 = d
r.
Therefore, the test performed by the decryption algorithm will pass, the output will be
e/hr = e/grz1 = e/u
z
1 = m.
2.3.2 Identity-based Encryption
The identity-based cryptosystem was first proposed by Shamir [60], which enables any
users to communicate securely without exchanging each other’s public/private key. The
identity-based cryptosystem assumes that there exists a trusted key generation center. This
kind of schemes are based on the public key cryptosystem with extra twist: instead of gen-
erating a random pair of public/private key and publishing the public key, the users choose
their unique identities. The corresponding private key is computed by a key generation
center when they first join the network system. Figure 2.3 The identity-based cryptosys-
Figure 2.3: This is the key generation of identity-based cryptosystem. The private key
of the receiver (to decrypt the ciphertext) is computed by its identity for encryption.
tem is conducted as Figure 2.4. Comparing to the public key encryption, the receiver
does not need to transfer its public key to the sender. Th implementation of identity-based
Figure 2.4: In the procedure of identity-based encryption, the identity of the receiver is
used to encrypt message.
encryption is always a challenge despite that the ideal has been realized by [67, 72] based
on the discrete logarithm problem. In [72], the original scheme is realized with the key
generation, encryption and decryption.
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• Key Generation. Denote the i-th user as a k-dimensional vector IDi =
(xi1,xi2, · · · ,xi j, · · · ,xik),1 ≤ j ≤ k,xi j ∈ {0,1}. Extend the identity to be a n-
dimensional vector EIDi = f (IDi) = (yi1,yi2, · · · ,yi j, · · · ,yik),1 ≤ j ≤ n,yi j ∈
{0,1}, where f (·) is a one-to-one function. The key generation center gener-
ates a n-dimensional vector ~a = (a1,a2, · · · ,an) as the secret information. The
public information is a n-dimensional vector
~h = (h1,h2, · · · ,hn) = (ga1,ga2, · · · ,gan).
The center generates the i-th user’s private key as si =~a ·EIDi.
• Encryption. Given a message m∈G with IDi, it computes zi = ∏nj=1 h
yi j
j . Then,
it chooses r at random and computes
c1 = gr,c2 = mzri .
The ciphertext is C = (c1,c2).
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext C = (c1,c2) on IDi, it computes (c1)si = (gr)si .
Then, compute
c2/(c1)si = m.
The most significant identity-based encryption was proposed by [13] which has the
chosen ciphertext security in random oracle model assuming the existence of computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman problem. It defines that an identity-based encryption contains four
algorithms Setup, Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt.
• Setup. Take a security parameter λ and return params (system parameters) and
master-key. params includes a description of a finite message space M, and
a description of a finite ciphertext space C. Intuitively, params will be publicly
known, while master-key will be known only to the “Private Key Generator”
(PKG) which will generate private keys for each user.
• Extract. Take as input params, master-key, and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0,1}∗,
and return a private key dID. Here ID is an arbitrary string that will be used as
a public key, and dID is the corresponding private decryption key.
• Encryption. Take as input params, ID, and M ∈ M. It returns a ciphertext
C ∈ C.
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• Decryption. Take as input params, C ∈ C, and a private key dID. It returns
M ∈M.
It satisfies the standard consistency constraint, namely when dID is the private key
generated by algorithm Extract when it is given ID as the public key, then
∀M ∈M,Decrypt(params,C,dID) = M, where C = Encrypt(params,M, ID).
The basicI scheme is a semantically secure assuming the existence of bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem. By applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [31] to the basic
scheme, the IBE can be strongly secure. Fujisaki-Okamoto define the hybrid scheme E hypk
as:
E hypk (M) = (Epk(σ ;H3(σ ,M)),H4(σ)
⊕
M).
Therefore, the IBE with chosen ciphertext security works as follows.
• Setup. As in the basic scheme. In addition, choose a hash function H3 :
{0,1}n×{0,1}n→ Z∗p, and a hash function H4 : {0,1}n→{0,1}n.
• Extract. As the basic scheme.
• Encryption. To encrypt M ∈M under the public key ID do the following:
1 Compute QID = H1(ID) ∈G1.
2 Choose a random σ ∈ {0,1}n.
3 Set r = H3(σ ,M).
4 Set the ciphertext to be
C =< rP,σ
⊕
H2(e(QID,Ppub)r),M
⊕
H4(σ)> .
• Decryption. Let C =< U,V,W >∈ C be a ciphertext encrypted using ID. If
U /∈G1 reject the ciphertext. To decrypt C using the private key dID ∈G1 do:
1 Compute V
⊕
H2(e(dID,U)) = σ .
2 Compute W
⊕
H4(σ) = M.
3 Set r = H3(σ ,M). Test that U = rP. If not, reject the ciphertext.
4 Output M as the decryption of C.
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The complete IBE is secure assuming the existence of BDH problem.
2.3.3 Public Key Searchable Encryption
Since the publish of the IBE from pairing, there are massive works motivated according
to the bilinear property used in [13]. Later, there are some work such as the encryption
with keyword search [12] or equality test [82] are proposed to search the data encrypted
with the public key encryption. To achieve the search over both the encrypted contents of
the email and the encrypted keywords, it appends to the ciphertext a Public-Key Encryp-
tion with keyword Search (PEKS) of each keyword. Send a message M with keywords
W1, · · · ,Wm as the form:
Epk(M)||PEKS(pk,W1)|| · · · ||PEKS(pk,Wm).
To build a non-interactive searchable encryption scheme from such a bilinear map, It
needs hash functions H1 : {0,1}∗→ G1 and H2 : G1→ {0,1}log p. The typical keyword
search encryption [12] from pairing which will do as follows:
• Key Generation. The input security parameter λ determines the size p of the
groups G1 and G2. The algorithm picks a random α ∈ Zp and a generator g of
G1. It outputs Apub = (g,h = gα) and Apriv = α .
• PEKS. Take the input as the keyword W , and public key Apub.
1 Compute t = e(H1(W ),hr) ∈G2 for a random r ∈ Zp.
2 Output PEKS(Apub,W ) = (gr,H2(t)).
• Trapdoor. Take the input as keyword W . Output TW = H1(W )α ∈G1.
• Test. Take the input as the PEKS denoted as S= (A,B) and trapdoor of keyword
W denoted as TW . Test if H2(e(TW ,A)) = B. If so, output “yes”; if not, output
“no”.
Their proposed PEKS is semantically secure against a chosen keyword attack in the
random oracle model assuming BDH is intractable. However, the typical PEKS cannot
support if people want to do an equality test (on the encrypted messages) between two
ciphertexts generated using different public keys. Therefore, the public key encryption
with ciphertext comparability in bilinear groups was suggested in [82]. In the construc-
tion, it assumes the existence of hash function H : G31 → {0,1}k+l , where k and l are
security parameters such that elements of G1 are represented in k bits and elements of Zp
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are represented in l bits. The PKE with ciphertext comparability (especially the equality
test) works as follows:
• Key Generation. The input security parameter λ determines the size p of the
groups G1 and G2. The algorithm picks a random α ∈ Zp and a generator g of
G1. Select x← Zp and compute y = gx. It outputs pk = y and sk = x.
• Encryption. To encrypt the message M ∈ G1 under the public key y do the
following:
1 Select r ∈ Zp.
2 Compute U = gr,V = Mr,W = H(U,V,yr)
⊕
M||r.
3 Output the ciphertext C = (U,V,W ).
• Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext C = (U,V,W ), compute M||r ←
H(U,V,Ux)
⊕
W. If (M ∈ G1 ∧ r ∈ Zp ∧U = gr ∧V = Mr), return M; other-
wise, return ⊥.
• Test. Given two ciphertexts C1 = (U1,V1,W1) and C2 = (U2,V2,W2), if
e(U1,V2) = e(U2,V1), return 1; otherwise, return 0.
Their construction is secure in the random oracle model assuming CDH is intractable.
It provides the camparability to the ciphertext under the public key encryption that can be
applied to the keyword search.
2.3.4 Digital Signature
The idea of “digital signature” was first proposed in Diffie and Hellman’s “New Directions
in Cryptography” [25]. In a digital signature scheme, each user publishes a public key
while keeping a private key secretly. A user’s signature is a value which depends on
message and on the user’s public and private keys. Anyone can check validity by using
the public key. A signature scheme is denoted by (Setup,KeyGenneration,Sign,Verify).
Formally, we define a digital signature as
Definition 18 (Digital Signature Scheme). A digital signature scheme consists of the fol-
lowing attributes:
• a system parameter pp: a set of parameters including plaintext message space,
signature space, signing key space and verification key space
• a plaintext message space M : a set of strings over some alphabet
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• a signature space S : a set of possible signatures
• a signing key space K : a set of possible keys for signature creation
• a verification key space K ′: a set of possible keys for signature verification
• an efficient set up algorithm Setup: N → pp
• an efficient key generation algorithm KeyGen: pp→K ×K ′
• an efficient signing algorithm Sign: M ×K →S
• an efficient verification algorithm Verify: M ×S ×K ′→{True,False}
However, it is intractable to forge a user’s signature without knowing the corresponding
private key Figure 2.5. In [36], the authors provide a systematic attack analysis that the
Figure 2.5: This is the digital signature. The signing algorithm is to compute the signa-
ture of message with user’s private key. The verification algorithm is to test whether the
signature is generated with the given message under the corresponding public key.
attacks are characterized into four kinds of attacks as follows:
• Known Message Attack. The enemy sees signatures for a set of messages M1, · · · ,Mk.
The messages are known to the enemy but are not in any way chosen by him.
• Generic Chosen Message Attack. The enemy is allowed to obtain from a valid
signatures for a chosen list of messages M1, · · · ,Mk before it attempts to break user’s
signature scheme. These messages are chosen by the enemy, but they are fixed
and independent of user’s public key ( for example the M∗’s may be chosen at
random). This attack is non-adaptive: the entire message list is constructed before
any signatures are seen. This attack is “generic” since it does not depend on the
user’s public key; the same attack is used against everyone.
• Directed Chosen Message Attack. This is similar to the generic chosen message
attack, except that the list of messages to be signed may depend on user’s public
key. However, it is still non-adaptive as before. This attack is “directed” against a
particular user.
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• Adaptive Chosen Message Attack. The enemy is also allowed to use a particular
user as an “oracle”; not only may he request from the user signatures of messages
which depend on user’s public key but he may also request signatures of messages
which depend additionally on previously obtained signatures.
We say the signature scheme is secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial time ad-
versary can forge a signature for at least one message. [37] For the general use of hash
function, we provide a formal definition to the strong security notion of adaptive chosen
message attack with one or more hash function.
Definition 19 (Adaptive Chosen Message Attack). An adaptive forger against a signature
scheme is a probabilistic polynomial-time (in k) algorithm, where k is a positive integer. It
takes as input a verification key vk, where (vk,sk)←KeyGen, and tries to forge signature
with respect to vk. The forger is allowed to request, and obtain, signature of message of
its choice. This is modeled by allowing the forger to access to the signing and hash
algorithms, both polynomial-times.
The forger is said to be (t(k),Adv(k))-break the signature scheme if in time t(k) with
probability Adv(k) it outputs a valid forgery ( a message-signature pair) (m,s) such that
Verifyvk(m,s) = True, where m is a recognizable message according the hash function
used in the scheme but is not one which has been input to Sign earlier by the signer. Here
t(k) is a polynomial, and Adv(k), a non-negligible quantity in k.
To achieve the secure digital signature, the researchers have done a massive attempts.
The classic digital signature proposed by El Gamal [33] is based on the difficulty of
computing discrete logarithm over finite fields. The basic idea is as follow: Let m be the
message to be signed, where m ∈ Zp.
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. Take the input as system parameter pp. It output the pub-
lic/private key (y = gx,x).
• Sign. To sign the message m, it do as follows:
1 Randomly choose k ∈ Zp.
2 Compute r = gk.
3 Find s that m = xr+ ks.
4 Output the signature (r,s).
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• Verify. To verify the signature (r,s) that is signed the message m under the
public key y, it tests that
gm = yr · rs.
If it holds, it returns “yes”; otherwise, “no”.
The demand of the short digital signature is motivated by the low-bandwidth communi-
cation environment. The digital signature from pairing significantly reduces the length of
the conventional digital signature scheme such as DSA, which uses the 160-bit length to
reach the similar security (half of the length of DSA) [14]. The signature scheme allows
the creation of signatures on arbitrary messages m ∈ {0,1}∗. A signature is an element
of G. Set the base group G and the generator g to be system parameters. Choose a
full-domain hash function H : {0,1}∗→G. The short signature works as follows.
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. Pick random x ← Z∗p, and compute y = gx. It output the
public/private key (y,x).
• Sign. To sign the message m with the given private key x, it does as follows:
1 Compute h← H(m).
2 Compute σ = hx.
3 Output the signature σ ∈G.
• Verify. To verify the signature σ that is signed the message m under the public
key y, it does as follows:
1 Compute h← H(m).
2 Test (g,y,h,σ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple that
e(h,y) = e(σ ,g).
If it holds, it returns “yes”; otherwise, “no”.
The security analysis views H as a random oracle to prove that the signature scheme
is secure against existential forgery under the adaptive chosen message attack. The im-
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proved probabilistic signature is to add a random salt by which the hash value is computed
with the message to be signed. (h = H(r||m), where r ∈ Zp) The more efficient security
proof of signature scheme is to replace the random salt r with the random bit b ∈ {0,1}.
Therefore, the reduction loose is reduced from 1n to
1
2 , where n is the number of hash value
that has been recorded in the oracle.
The random oracle is a strong assumption since there does not exist a random oracle
in the real world. Thus, the signature scheme without random oracle is urgently required
for the real-world applications. The signature proposed by Boneh and Boyen is secure
against the existential forgery in standard model [11] that assumes the intractability of
strong Diffie-Hellman problem. Let (G1,G2) be bilinear groups both with the prime
order p. g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 a generator of G2. It assumes that the messages
m to be signed are elements in Zp. The domain can be extended to all of {0,1}∗ using a
collision resistant hash function H : {0,1}∗→ Zp. It works as follows:
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. Pick random x,y← Zp, and compute u← gx2 ∈ G2 and v←
gy2 ∈G2. The public key is (g1,g2,u,v). The private key is (x,y).
• Sign. Given a private key x,y ∈ Zp and a message m ∈ Zp, it does as follows:
1 Choose a radom r ∈ Zp.
2 Compute σ = g
1
x+m+yr
1 ∈G1
If x+m+ yr = 0, try again with a different random r. The signature is (σ ,r).
• Verify. Given a public key (g1,g2,u,v), a message m, and a signature (σ ,r), test
that
e(σ ,u ·gm2 · vr) = e(g1,g2).
If it holds, it returns “yes”; otherwise, “no”.
Signature schemes are particularly interesting for applications in privacy-enhancing
cryptographic protocols.
2.3.5 Structure-preserving Signature
To design a ad hoc constructions as a modular approach for cryptographic protocols with-
out losing the efficiency, or conceptual simplicity, the structure-preserving signatures are
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suggested by Masayuki Abe et.al. A signature scheme is structure-preserving if its ver-
ification keys, signatures, and messages are elements in a bilinear group, and the verifi-
cation equation is a conjunction of pairing-product equations [1]. In signature schemes,
the message space usually consists of integers in Zord(G) of some group G, or arbitrary
strings mapped to either integer in Zord{G} or elements of a group G via a cryptographic
hash function. The hash function is often modeled as a random oracle. The structure-
preserving signature is to solve the signing issue of the last case. The structure-preserving
signature is a combination of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and signature scheme,
commonly applying to the privacy-protection cryptographic protocols.
The idea of structure-preserving signature was proposed by Abe et.al along with a spe-
cial commitment. The commitment is constructed with pairing-product equations. The
commitment scheme will have message space Mck = Gn2 , randomizer space Rck = G2
and commitment space Cck = GT . When an n-tuple of base group elements to be com-
mitted, the commitment consists of a single target group element. Set the bilinear group
(p,G1,G2,GT ,e,G)← G (λ ) as the system parameters, where G,H are the generators of
the bilinear groups. The commitment works as follows.
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. On input the system parameter pp, it does as follows:
1 Choose GR←G1 and x1, · · · ,xn← Zp.
2 Set G1 = G
x1
R , · · · ,Gn = G
xn
R .
3 Output the commitment key ck = (GR,G1, · · · ,Gn) and trapdoor keys tk =
(ck,x1, · · · ,xn).
• Commit. Given commitment key ck and message (M1, · · · ,Mn) ∈Gn2, it does as
follows:
1 Randomly choose R←G2.
2 Compute the commitment
C = e(GR,R)
n
∏
i=1
e(Gi,Mi).
• Open. Given a commitment C ∈GT with opening (M1, · · · ,Mn,R) ∈Gn2×G2,
another message (M′1, · · · ,M′n) ∈Gn2 , and the trapdoor key tk
1 Compute R′ = R∏ni=1(Mi/M
′
i)
xi .
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2 This gives us a trapdoor opening (M′1, · · · ,M′n,R′) satisfying
C = e(GR,R)
n
∏
i=1
e(Gi,Mi) = e(GR,R′)
n
∏
i=1
e(Gi,M′i).
The commitment is homomorphic, perfectly hiding and computationally binding. If the
verification keys lie in the message space, we call them automorphic signature. Choose
random elements F,K,T ∈ G1 and set the bilinear groups and F,K,T as the system pa-
rameters. The message space is DH :− {(Gm,Hm)|m ∈ Zp}. The automorphic signature
works as follows.
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. On input the system parameter pp, it does as follows:
1 Choose x← Zp .
2 Set the public key as pk = (Gx,Hx) and the private key as sk = x.
• Sign. Given the system parameters, a private key sk and a message (M,N) ∈
DH, it does as follows:
1 Randomly choose c,r← Zp.
2 Compute the signature
A = (K ·T r ·M)
1
x+c , C = Fc, D = Hc, R = Gr, S = Hr.
• Verify. Given a public key pk = (X ,Y ), a message (M,N)∈DH, and a signature
C = (A,C,D,R,S), test if
e(A,Y ·D) = e(K ·M,H) ·e(T,S) e(C,H) = e(F,D) e(R,H) = e(G,H).
The signature is strongly existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack
assuming the existence of computational hard problems such as the double paring prob-
lem, SXDH problem, AWF-CDH problem [1], and variant of Diffie-Hellman problems.
The further research on structure-preserving signature is to achieve the lower bound and
shorter signature scheme. The typical optimal structure-preserving signature for a vector
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of messages that simultaneously signs a Diffie-Hellman pair and a vector from Zp is of
Type-III bilinear groups. The scheme is as follows.
• Setup. Take the input as security parameter λ . It outputs the system parameter
pp.
• Key Generation. On input the system parameter pp, it does as follows:
1 Choose x,y1, · · · ,yk,z ∈ Zp.
2 Set X = Hx,Yi = Hyi , for all 1≤ i≤ k, and Z = Hz.
3 Output the public key pk = (X ,Y1, · · · ,Yk,Z) and the private key
x,y1, · · · ,yk,z.
• Sign. To sign a Diffie-Hellman pair (M,N) and a vector u = (u1, · · · ,uk) ∈ Zp,
it does as follows:
1 Choose r← Zp.
2 Set R = Gr,S = (M ·Gx+∑ki=1 uiyi)
r
z .
3 Return σ = (R,S) ∈G2.
• Verify. It returns “yes”, iff the following equation holds:
e(S,Z) = e(R,N) · e(R,X)
k
∏
i=1
e(R,Y uii ).
Otherwise, “no”.
Chapter 3
ID-based Encryption with Equality Test
against Insider Attack
Testing if two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext is an interesting cryptographic prim-
itive. It is usually referred to as equality test of encrypted data or equality test. One of at-
tractive applications of equality test is for encrypted database systems, where the database
server hosts the encrypted databases and clients can query if the plaintext embedded in a
ciphertext on a database is equal to that in the queried ciphertext without decryption. Al-
though it is not hard to achieve with the pairing-based cryptography, the security against
the insider attack (by the database server) is a challenging task. In this chapter, we pro-
pose a novel equality test scheme aiming to solve the problem. Our scheme adopts the
identity-based cryptography. We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle
model.
3.1 Introduction
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) [82] is an interesting
technique with wide applications such as in outsourced database systems, which host and
manage encrypted data for clients. The merit of the equality test scheme is that one can
check whether two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext without decrypting them.
In the original equality test scheme [82], outsourced database servers are usually con-
sidered to be semi-trusted because of its curiosity on client data. We call it an “Honest
but Curious” (HBC) server. It is practical for the server to obtain the illegal profit from
peddling client’s private data by simple brute force attacks on the encrypted message.
Our scheme should resist this kind of adversaries, even we assume that the adversary has
access to all ciphertexts and can test their equality, which is called “insider attack” [54].
An HBC server (the insider), who runs the test algorithm correctly and continuously, can
perform any polynomial time computation and then obtain the information beyond its
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own.
3.1.1 Related Work
Boneh et al. first proposed a public key encryption with keyword search scheme (PEKS)
in the random oracle model [12]. When a client conducts a search, he can generate a trap-
door with a keyword and his private key. Taking the generated trapdoor and a ciphertext,
the test algorithm will output “accept” if they contain the same keyword; otherwise, “re-
ject”. Their work provides a solution to the equality test on encrypted keywords in public
key encryption.
To provide a general equality test scheme, Yang et al. proposed the first public key
encryption with equality test (PKEET) [82]. In PKEET, given two tags Ti and Tj on ci-
phertexts Ci and C j generated with PKi and PK j corresponding to message Mi and M j, re-
spectively, there is a function Test(·, ·), which outputs 1 iff Mi = M j. Their work achieves
the security against the One-way Chosen Ciphertext Attack (OW-CCA). There are some
extensions of PKEET which offer the fine or flexible grain authorization and stronger
security [70, 69, 41, 52, 53, 51]. To achieve the stronger security, the authorization mech-
anism is adopted to these PKEET schemes. Some of them utilize trapdoors generated
from private keys which are used to the authorization process. As an instance, Ma et al.
in [52], proposed a PKEET with the flexible authorization according to four scenarios.
In [53], Ma et al. provided a solution to the PKEET in multi-user setting by delegat-
ing the equality test to a fully trusted proxy. Later, Ma [51] proposed an identity-based
PKEET (IBEET). These works improved the security of PKEET to IND-CCA security,
while private keys are kept secret. However, none of their works can resist the insider
attack.
Mayer et al. [54] proposed a verifiable private equality test (VPET) for multi-party
computation. The protocol resists attacks launched by HBC entities and active malicious
entities who can behave active malicious actions. However, it requires that all clients are
online during testing and generate a proof for each equality test. It is therefore impractical
for the cloud storage management and outsourced database services, which require clients
to be offline. Constructions presented in [44, 20] also provide solutions to insider attacks
for the PEKS schemes, but not for the general equality test. Chen et al. in [20] proposed
a PEKS scheme based on the dual-server framework. Peng et al. [44] proposed a PEKS
scheme to prevent the trapdoor generated globally by containing identity set in trapdoors
by keeping this set secret, so that the insider attack is eliminated.
3.1.2 Contribution
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test was proposed by Yang et al.
[82]. However, their scheme is vulnerable to the above insider attack. Since the ciphertext
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can be generated publicly, the HBC server can test the embedded message in the target
ciphertext on its guess. To address this problem, we propose an efficient identity-based
equality test scheme with resistance against the insider attack as our contributions. We
define a novel security model for the confidentiality of IBEET which allows the adversary
to conduct the equality test on all ciphertexts but can not generate ciphertexts. We refer
it to as Weak-IND-ID-CCA (W-IND-ID-CCA). Nevertheless, it is stronger than security
models for previous works under the same attack.
3.2 Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we provide some pre-
liminaries for our construction. In Section 3.4, we formulate the notion of IBEET-IA.
In Section 3.5, we present the construction of IBEET-IA and prove its security in Sec-
tion 3.6. In Section 3.7, we construct a secure outsourced database application based on
IBEET-IA and present the experimental results. In Section 3.8, we conclude our chapter.
3.3 Preliminary
Our construction is built on Type-1 bilinear group.
3.3.1 Short Signature without Random Oracle
Recall that the short signature scheme in plain model is proposed by Boneh and Boyen
[11]. The security of their scheme depends on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
The q-SDHP in (G1,G2,e) is as follows: Given q+ 2-tuple (g1,g2,gx2,g
x2
2 , · · · ,gx
q
2 ) as
input, output a pair (c,g
1
x+c
1 ), where c ∈ Z∗p. An polynomial algorithm A has advantage
ε(·) in solving q-SDHP in (G1,G2,e) if
Pr[A (g1,g2,gx2,g
x2
2 , · · · ,gx
q
2 ) = (c,g
1
x+c
1 )]≤ ε(λ ),
where the probability is over the random choice of x in Z∗p and the random bits consumed
by A .
We adopt the weak construction of their short signature. It is sufficient to guarantee the
secure of our scheme from the attack by forging an invalid pair of elements and testing
with other valid ciphertexts. We recall their construction which consists of three algorithm
(KeyGen, Sign, Vefiry).
• KeyGen. Pick random x ∈ Zp, and compute v = gx2 ∈ G2. The public key is
(g1,g2,v). The secret key is x.
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• Sign. Given a secret key x and a message m ∈ Zp, output the signature σ ←
g1/(x+m)1 ∈ G1. Here 1/(x+m) is computed modulo p. By convention in this con-
text we define 1/0 to be 0 so that in the unlikely event that x+m = 0 we have
σ ← 1.
• Verify. Given a public key (g1,g2,v), a message m ∈ Zp, and a signature σ ∈ G1,
verify that
e(σ ,v ·gm2 ) = e(g1,g2)
If equality holds output valid. If σ = 1 and vgm2 = 1 output valid. Otherwise, output
invalid.
3.4 Definitions and Security Model
In this section, we give formal definitions of our scheme and security model. Our scheme
achieves chosen ciphertext security (i.e. W-IND-ID-CCA) under the defined security
model.
3.4.1 ID-based Encryption with Equality Test against Insider Attack
We propose an ID-based encryption with equality test. The scheme Ω consists of a set of
algorithms: Ω = (Setup,Extract,Join,Enc,Test,Dec).
• Setup(1λ ): It takes the secure parameter λ and outputs the system public parame-
ters pp, the master secret key msk.
• Extract(ID,msk): It takes (ID,msk) and pp and outputs the private key dID.
• Join({ID}): It takes a set of identities {ID} and outputs a group token tok via a
secure protocol.
• Enc(m, ID,Ppub, tok): It takes (m, ID, tok,Ppub) and outputs the ciphertext C =(c1,c2,c3,c4).
• Test(CA, CB): It takes ciphertexts CA and CB produced by user A and user B, re-
spectively. It outputs 1 if messages associated with CA and CB are equal. Otherwise,
it outputs 0.
• Dec(C,dID, tok): It takes the ciphertext C, dID and tok and outputs the message m,
if C is a valid ciphertext under ID. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥ .
Note: pp refers to public parameters and hash functions used in our scheme.
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3.4.2 Security Models
In the model, we assume that the “insider” attacker have the access to Test, three oracles
including the client’s private key except the challenged client, encryption and decryption.
The attacker can query the oracles during the attack at any time. The attacker can take ad-
vantage of the information gained from the queries and figure out the challenged message
contains one out of two claimed message.
Definition 20 (Weak-IND-ID-CCA (W-IND-ID-CCA)). The scheme is Weak-IND-ID-
CCA, if the scheme is secure from the insider attack defined as follows. Let Ω = (Setup,
Extract,Join,Enc,Test, Dec) be the scheme and A be a polynomial time adversary.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to initialize the system and obtains
Ppub, msk and the challenged group token tok. It gives Ppub to the adversary A .
• Phase 1: The adversary issues queries q1, q2, · · · , qm where qi is one of:
– H1 Query (IDi). The challenger responds by running H1(·) to generate gIDi . It
sends gIDi to the adversary.
– Extract Query (IDi). The challenger responds by running Extract algorithm to
generate the private key dIDi corresponding to the public key IDi. It sends dIDi
to the adversary.
– H2 Query (G31×G2). The challenger responds by running H2(·) to generate
the corresponding hash value. It sends the hash value to the adversary.
– Encryption Query (mi, IDi). The challenger responds by running Enc to gen-
erate the ciphertext Ci corresponding to (mi, IDi). It sends the ciphertext Ci to
the adversary.
– Decryption Query (Ci, IDi). The challenger responds by running Extract al-
gorithm to generate dIDi corresponding to IDi. It then runs Dec to decrypt the
ciphertext Ci using dIDi . It sends the resulting plaintext to the adversary.
• Challenge: Once A decides the Phase 1 is over, it sends two equal-length mes-
sages m0,m1 and ID∗ to be challenged to the challenger, where both m0,m1 are
not issued in the Encryption Query and ID∗ is not issued in the Extract Query
in the Phase 1. The challenger randomly picks b ∈ {0,1}, and responds with
C∗← Enc(mb, ID∗,Ppub, tok).
• Phase 2: The adversary issues queries qm+1, qm+2, · · · , qn where qi is one of:
– H1 Query (IDi). The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
– Extract Query (IDi) where IDi 6= ID∗. The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
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– H2 Query (G31×G2). The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
– Encryption Query (mi, IDi) where mi /∈ {m0,m1}. The challenger responds as
in Phase 1.
– Decryption Query (Ci, IDi) where (Ci, IDi) 6= (C∗, ID∗). The challenger re-
sponds as in Phase 1.
• Output: Finally, A gives a guess b′ on b. If b′ = b, we say A wins the game.
We define A ’s advantage on breaking the scheme as
AdvW-IND-ID-CCA
Ω,A (H1,H2,Extract,Enc,Dec)
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣= ε(λ ),
where ε(λ ) is a polynomial of λ . Ω is W-IND-ID-CCA secure if ε(λ ) is a negligible
function. In the W-IND-ID-CCA model, the adversary has access to ciphertexts without
any valid tok.
3.5 Concrete Construction
Our scheme aims to provide the service for designated senders. That is, the receiver and
its designated senders form a group of users. tok denotes a secret information shared
among group members. The server and other users can only conduct the equality test.
Our protocol consists of the following five algorithms:
• Setup(1λ ): Initially, the system takes a security parameter λ and returns public
system parameters pp, the master secret key msk.
1. The system generates two multiplicative groups G1 and G2 with the same
prime order p of λ -length bits and a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2. The
system selects an arbitrary generator g ∈G1.
2. The system selects α $← Z∗p as msk and sets Ppub = gα .
3. The system chooses three hash functions:
H : {0,1}t → Z∗p, H1 : {0,1}∗→G1, H2 : G31×G2→{0,1}t+l,
where l is the length of random numbers and t is the length of messages. It
publishes pp= {λ , p, t, l,g,Ppub,e,H,H1,H2}.
• Extract(ID,msk): PKG generates dID for each user’s ID.
gID = H1(ID), dID = gαID,
where dID is distributed via a secure channel.
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• Join({ID}). Users organize a small group and share a common secret token tok = β
via a secure protocol.
• Enc(m, ID,Ppub, tok): To encrypt m, it selects two random numbers r1,r2
$← Z∗p,
with |r1|= l. Then it computes
c1 = g
r1
H(m)+tok
ID , c2 = g
r1
ID, c3 = g
r2,
c4 = (m ‖ r1)⊕H2(c1 ‖ c2 ‖ c3 ‖ e(Ppub,gID)r2).
Finally, it returns C = (c1,c2,c3,c4).
• Test(CA,CB): Suppose that
CA← Enc(mA, IDA,Ppub,gIDA)
and
CB← Enc(mB, IDB,Ppub,gIDB)
are generated by user A and user B, respectively. With CA = (cA,1,cA,2, cA,3,cA,4)
and CB = (cB,1,cB,2,cB,3,cB,4), the test algorithm on CA and CB runs as follows:
e(cA,1,cB,2) = e(cB,1,cA,2). (3.1)
If the equation holds, it explains the equality between mA and mB, then outputs 1.
Otherwise, outputs 0.
• Dec(C,dID, tok): To decrypt the ciphertext C with dID and tok, it computes:
m ‖ r1 = c4⊕H2(c1 ‖ c2 ‖ c3 ‖ e(c3,dID)).
If
c1 = g
r1
H(m)+tok
ID ∧ c2 = g
r1
ID,
it returns m. Otherwise, ⊥.
3.5.1 Correctness
We say that Ω has the ciphertext comparability with error µ , for some function µ(·). For
instance, we run the equality test on CA←Enc(mA, IDA, Ppub, tok), CB←Enc(mB, IDB,Ppub, tok)
generated by user A and user B, respectively.
CA = (cA,1,cA,2,cA,3,cA,4), CB = (cB,1,cB,2,cB,3,cB,4)
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We compute the left hand side (L) and the right hand side (R) of 3.1 in the Test algorithm,
respectively. We analyze it in two cases: mA = mB and mA 6= mB.
L := e(cA,1,cB,2)
= e(grA,1/(tok+H(mA))IDA ,g
rB,1
IDB
)
= e(grA,1/(tok+H(mA))IDA ,g
rB,1
IDB
)
= e(gIDA,gIDB)
rA,1rB,1/(tok+H(mA))
R := e(cB,1,cA,2)
= e(grB,1/(tok+H(mB))IDB ,g
rA,1
IDA
)
= e(grB,1/(tok+H(mB))IDB ,g
rA,1
IDA
)
= e(gIDB ,gIDA)
rA,1rB,1/(tok+H(mB))
Case 1: If mA = mB, the equation holds with the probability of 1;
Case 2: If mA 6= mB, the equation holds when the collision occurs in hash function H(m),
that is H(mA) = H(mB) while mA 6= mB. We define H(m) is a collision resistant hash
function. Pr[H(mA) = H(mB)|mA 6= mB] is a negligible function.
3.6 Security Analysis
Our scheme is a chosen ciphertext secure IBEET (i.e. W-IND-ID-CCA), assuming BDH
is hard in groups generated by a BDH parameter generator.
Theorem 2. Let A be a W-IND-ID-CCA adversary on IBEET-IA that making at most
qe times extract queries and qd times decryption queries achieves advantage at least ε .
Then there is a BDH algorithm B solving the BDH problem with the advantage at least
ε
e(qe+qd+1)
.
Proof. Suppose there is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A who achieves
the advantage ε on breaking Ω = (Setup,Join, Extract,Enc, Test,Dec). Given a BDH
instance, a PPT adversary B will take advantage of A to solve the BDH problem with
the probability of ε ′. Hence, if the BDH assumption holds, then ε ′ is negligible and
consequently ε must be negligible.
Assume B holds a BDH tuple (g,U,V,R), where x = loggU , y = loggV and z = logg R
are unkown. Let g be the generator of G1. Finally, B is supposed to output e(g,g)xyz ∈G2.
The game between B and A runs as follows:
Setup: B sets Ppub = gx·r =U r, where r
$← Z∗p and sets tok = β
$← Z∗p. B gives Ppub to
A .
Phase 1:
• H1 Query. A can query the random oracle H1 at any time. A queries IDi to obtain
gIDi . B responds with gIDi if IDi has been in the H1 table, (IDi,gIDi,ai,coini).
Otherwise, for each IDi, B responds as follows:
– B tosses a coin with Pr[coini = 0] = δ . If coini = 1, responds to A with
gIDi = g
ai , ai
$← Z∗p. Otherwise, B sets gIDi = gaiy =V ai .
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– B responds with gIDi , then adds (IDi,gIDi,ai,coini) in the H1 table, which is
initially empty.
• Extract Query. A queries the private key of IDi. B responds as follows:
– B obtains H1(IDi) = gIDi in the H1 table. If coini = 0, B responds with⊥ and
terminates the game.
– Otherwise, B responds with dIDi = P
ai
pub = U
r·ai , where ai,gIDi is in the H1
table.
– B sends dIDi to A , then stores (dIDi,ai, IDi) in the private key list, which is
initially empty.
• H2 Query. A queries Di ∈ G31×G2. B responds with Wi ∈ H2(Di) in the H2 table.
Otherwise, for every Di, B selects a random string Wi = {0,1}t+l as the H2(Di). B
responds A with H2(Di) and adds (Di,Wi) in the H2 table, which is initially empty.
• Encryption Query. A queries mi encrypted with IDi. B responds as follows:
– B searches the H1 table to obtain the gIDi .
– Then B selects ri,1,ri,2
$← Z∗p and computes:
ci,1 = g
ri,1/(tok+H(mi))
IDi
, ci,2 = g
ri,1
IDi
, ci,3 = gri,2,
Di = ci,1 ‖ ci,2 ‖ ci,3 ‖ e(Ppub,gIDi)
ri,2 .
– B queries OH2 to obtain Wi = H2(Di).
– B computes ci,4 = (mi ‖ ri,1)⊕Wi.
B responds with Ci = (ci,1,ci,2,ci,3,ci,4).
• Decryption Query. A queries Ci to be decrypted in IDi. B responds as follows:
– B searches the H1 table to obtain the gIDi . If coini = 1, obtain dIDi of IDi in
the private key list to decrypt Ci. Then B computes the bilinear map with dIDi:
e(ci,3,dIDi) = e(g
ri,2 ,gaixr) = e(g,U)ri,2air.
– After that, B computes Di = ci,1 ‖ ci,2 ‖ ci,3 ‖ e(Ppub,gIDi)ri,2 and obtains Wi
in the H2 table. B obtains mi and ri,1 by ci,4⊕Wi.
– Eventually, B computes c′i,1,c
′
i,2 with mi and ri,1 decrypted from Ci. If it is a
valid ciphertext that c′i,1 = ci,1 and c
′
i,2 = ci,2, B responds with mi. Otherwise,
⊥.
3.6. SECURITY ANALYSIS 40
Challenge: Once A decides the Phase 1 is over, A outputs two equal-length messages
m0, m1 and ID∗ to be challenged, where both m0, m1 are not issued in Encryption Query
and ID∗ is not queried in Extract Query in Phase 1. B responds as follows:
• B encrypts m0 and m1 and gets C0 and C1.
• If B searches the H1 table. If coin∗ = 1, then B responds with ⊥ and terminates
the game, since gID∗ = ga
∗
.
• Otherwise, B randomly selects b∈{0,1}. Since gID∗ = gya
∗
=V a
∗
, B can calculate
c∗1 = g
r∗1/(tok+H(mb))
ID∗ , c
∗
2 = g
r∗1
ID∗, c
∗
3 = R = g
z, c∗4 = (mb||r∗1)⊕W ∗,
where W ∗ = H2(D∗) and D∗ = c∗1 ‖ c∗2 ‖ c∗3 ‖ e(Ppub,gID∗)z (that e(Ppub,gID∗)z is
unknown which B wants A to compute). C∗ = (c∗1,c
∗
2, c
∗
3,c
∗
4) is a valid ciphertext
for mb.
• B responds A with C∗.
Phase 2:
• H1 Query. A queries as in Phase 1.
• Extract Query. A queries as in Phase 1, except that IDi 6= ID∗.
• H2 Query. A issues the query as in Phase 1.
• Encryption Query. A queries as in Phase 1, except that the message mi /∈ {m0,m1}.
• Decryption Query. A queries as in Phase 1, except that the ciphertext (Ci, IDi) 6=
(C∗, ID∗).
Output: A gives a guess b′ on b. If b′ 6= b, B responds with failure and terminates the
game. If b′ = b, then B gets the result of the BDH tuple by guessing the inputs of H2
Query. Suppose Dout = D∗, B obtains e(Ppub,gID∗)z directly from Dout by removing first
3k bits (the elements in G1 and G2 is k bits length.) that is c∗1 ‖ c∗2 ‖ c∗3. Then B obtains
e(g,g)xyz = e(Ppub,gID∗)z
(a∗r)−1 = (e(U,V )za
∗r)(a
∗r)−1 .
Claim 1. If the algorithm B does not abort during the simulation then the algorithm A ’s
view is identical to its view in the real attack. Furthermore, if B does not abort then∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣ ≥ εe(qe+qd+1) . The probability over the random bits used by A , B and
the challenger.
It remains to bound the probability that B aborts during the simulation. The algorithm
B could abort for three reasons: (1) a bad private key extraction query from A during the
phase 1 or 2, (2) A chooses a bad ID to be challenged on, or (3) a bad decryption query
from A during the phase 1 or 2. We define three corresponding events:
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ε1: B aborts at the Extract Query step.
ε2: B aborts at the Decryption Query step.
ε3: B aborts at the Challenge step.
We have
Pr[¬ε1∧¬ε2∧¬ε3]≥ (1−δ )qe+qd δ .
We provide the proof on Pr[¬ε1∧¬ε2∧¬ε3] by induction on the maximum number of
queries qe + qd made by the adversary. Let ε0···i be the event that ε1 ∨ ε2 ∨ ε3 happens
after A queries at most i times and let i = qe + qd . Similarly, let ε i be the event that
ε1∨ ε2∨ ε3 happens for the first time when A queries the ith item. For i = 0, it is trivial
that Pr[¬ε0···0] = δ . Suppose that for i−1 the Pr[¬ε0···i−1] = (1−δ )i−1δ holds. Then for
i, it holds
Pr[¬ε0···i] = Pr[¬ε0···i|¬ε0···i−1]Pr[¬ε0···i−1]
= Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1]Pr[¬ε0···i−1]
≥ Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1](1−δ )i−1δ .
Hence, we bound the probability of ε i not to happen with A ’s ith query. The query is
either an Extract Query for IDi or a Decryption Query for (Ci, IDi). Recall that if coini = 1
it cannot cause ε1 and ε2 to happen. We consider three cases:
Case 1 The ith query is the first time A queries IDi. In this case, Pr[coini = 1] = 1−δ and
hence
Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1]≥ 1−δ .
Case 2 IDi was queried in previous Extract Query. Assuming the previous query did not
cause ε0···i−1 to happen we have coini = 1. Hence,
Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1] = 1.
Case 3 IDi was queried in the previous Decryption Query. Similarly to Case 2, we have
coini = 1, Hence,
Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1] = 1.
To summarize, we have
Pr[¬ε i|¬ε0···i−1]≥ 1−δ
whatever the ith query is. Therefore,
Pr[¬ε i]≥ (1−δ )iδ
is as required. Since
Pr[¬ε1∧¬ε2∧¬ε3]≥ (1−δ )qe+qd δ ,
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the success probability is maximum at δopt . Using δopt = 1qe+qd+1 , the probability that B
does not abort is at least 1e(qe+qd+1) . This shows that B’s advantage is at least
ε
e(qe+qd+1)
as required.
Remark 1. Comparing to the conventional equality test, we adopt a different signature
structure to construct the tags, which will be the input of test algorithm. The reason is
when we use the structure like BLS signature, the “insider” will be easy to find out the
content in the tag with the equation grm+tokID = g
rm
ID ·gtokID . It can gain grmID and test e(grmID,g)
with e(gm
′
ID,g
r), where m′ is selected from a content dictionary.
Remark 2. Suppose the q-SDH assumption holds in (G1,G2). Then the signature scheme
above is secure against existential forgery under a weak chosen message attack. The proof
is referred to [11]. The security of the simple construction in [11] implies the security of
our construction. If the construction is secure against existential forgery under a weak
chosen message attack, our construction is secure under the W-IND-ID-CCA.
Remark 3. Responses to H1 queries are as in the real attack since responses are uni-
formly and independently distributed in G∗1. All responses to the private key extraction
queries and decryption queries are valid. Finally, the challenge ciphertext C∗ given to A
is the encryption of mb for some random b ∈ {0,1}. Therefore, by the definition of A we
have that ∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣≥ εe(qe +qd +1) .
3.7 Performance Analysis
3.7.1 Setup of Experiments
The purpose of our experiments is to demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of our
scheme. The instantiation of our novel IBEET-IA scheme is implemented in Java with
the Java Pairing Based Cryptography library (JPBC) [23]. In our experiments, type A
pairing is invoked for the configuration of our IBEET-IA program, which is symmetri-
cally built from type A super-singular elliptic curve with the embedding degree of twoa.
Precisely, the length of elements is 512 bits for G1 and 1024 bits for G2. For the database,
MySQL on a virtual machine with 1024MB memory and one processing core is used as
the experimental environment. Detailed parameters of our experiments are shown in ta-
ble 3.1. To evaluate our work in the real world applications, we simulate the condition
locally. Experiments were conducted on the practical database with eight tables, which
are constructed with columns over rows on 4× 273, 8× 23, 6× 326, 5× 2996, 9× 7,
aType A internals. URL: https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/manual/ch08s03.html.
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Table 3.1: Experimental environment
Hardware Parameter
Computer Mac Pro 13’ 2015
Processor 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5
Operation System OS X El Capitan 10.11.6
Memory 8 GB 1867 MHz DDR3
Cores 2
Software Parameter
Virtual Machine VMware Fusion 7
VM OS Ubuntu 14.04.3
VM Memory 1024 MB
VM Core 1
Database MySQL
Development Java 1.8 + Eclipse + JPBC
4× 273, 8× 110 and 3× 7, respectively. After running three experiments on three algo-
rithms, Enc, Dec and Test, the efficiency of those algorithms are analyzed. The results are
shown in the following subsections.
3.7.2 Performance Evaluation
In the following three experiments, the total time cost is linear with the size of entities to
be encrypted, decrypted or tested. In Enc and Dec algorithms, they conduct a pairing and
three exponents, simultaneously. Therefore, the average time consumption is the same,
0.3 second (or 0.3s) to 0.2s for each entity in the encryption and the decryption containing
the reading and writing time. The average time consumption is 0.1s for each equality test,
which is a reasonable result and can be accepted by practice applications.
Encryption Performance The encryption encrypted with the user’s ID. For the i-th en-
cryption on mi, it inputs ID and the value of the current cell and computes
ci1 = g
ri1/(tok+H(mi))
ID , c
i
2 = g
ri1
ID, c
i
3 = g
ri2,
ci4 = (mi ‖ ri1)⊕H2(ci1 ‖ ci2 ‖ ci3 ‖ e(Ppub,gID)r
i
2),
where ri1,r
i
2
$← Z∗p, with |ri1| = l. Finally, it returns Ci = (ci1,ci2,ci3,ci4). Results on the
total time consumption over the encryption in each experiment are shown as table 3.2.
The time consumption of the Enc algorithm is linear with the number of cells to be
encrypted. Enc contains one pairing and three exponent computations.
Decryption Performance We conducted the decryption operation on the random selected
column to evaluate the performance of our decryption algorithm. For the i-th decryption
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Table 3.2: Encryption performance
Cells RT [ms]
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Table 3.3: Decryption performance
Cells RT [ms]
7 1640
23 5432
110 27181
122 32544
273 64894
326 74367
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]
on captured (ci1,c
i
2,c
i
3,c
i
4), it takes ID and the value of the set and computes
mi ‖ ri1 = ci4⊕H2(ci1 ‖ ci2 ‖ ci3 ‖ e(c3,dID)).
If
ci1 = g
r1/(tok+H(mi))
ID ∧ c
i
2 = g
ri1
ID,
it returns mi. Otherwise, it returns ⊥. The results on the total time consumption over the
decryption in each experiment are shown as table 3.3.
The time consumption of the Dec algorithm is linear with the number of cells to be
decrypted. Dec contains one pairing and two exponent computations.
Equality Test Performance We conducted the equality test between two tables who have
the same column. For the i-th equality test, it takes IDs and two ciphertexts which are
Ci = (ci1,c
i
2,c
i
3,c
i
4) and C
j = (c j1,c
j
2,c
j
3,c
j
4), respectively, and checks whether e(c
i
1,c
j
2) is
equal to e(c j1,c
i
2). Results on the total time consumption over the equality test in each
experiment are shown in table 3.4.
The time consumption of the Test algorithm is linear with the number of cells to be
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Table 3.4: Equality test performance
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Table 3.5: Comparing the efficiency of algorithms of variant PKEETs with our scheme
PKEETs IA Enc Dec Test Auth. Security
[82] N 3Exp 3Exp 2P N/A OW-CCA
[69] N 4Exp 2Exp 4P 3Exp OW/IND-CCA
[70] N 5Exp 2Exp 4Exp N/A OW/IND-CCA
[41] N 4Exp 4Exp 6Exp+2P 5Exp OW/IND-CCA
[53] N 1P+5Exp 1P+4Exp 4P+2Exp 3Exp OW/IND-CCA
[51] N 6Exp 2P+2Exp 4P 2Exp OW-ID-CCA
Ours Y 1P+3Exp 1P+2Exp 2P N/A W-IND-ID-CCA
conducted the equality test. Test contains only two pairing computations. The deviation
of the performance might be caused by the instability of the CPU used in our simulation.
Comparison There are some PKEET variants. We made a comparison on the efficiency
of algorithms adopted in these schemes. “Exp” refers to the exponent computation. “P”
refers to the pairing computation. “Auth.” refers to the authorization.
The extended PKEET schemes cost three to four steps to conduct the equality test
including analyzing trapdoor and inverse-computing trapdoor. In the contrast, our scheme
only needs two pairing computations to conduct the equality test. The results in table 3.5
indicate the improvement on efficiency in our scheme comparing with other schemes. In
addition to efficiency, our scheme has shown the improvement on security and achieved
the first W-IND-ID-CCA which is stronger than OW-ID-CCA.
3.8 Conclusion
The probabilistic public key encryption with equality test proposed by Yang et al. in 2010
at CT-RSA and its extended works are vulnerable to the insider attack launched by the
semi-trusted server by guessing on the embedding message. The server can test whether
the guessed message is equal to that contained in the target ciphertext. To solve this
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problem, we propose a novel IBEET-IA scheme which a reasonable efficiency. In order
to prove that our scheme is chosen ciphertext secure, we propose a novel W-IND-ID-
CCA security model under the defined insider attack. We also demonstrate its efficiency
by experiments on a real database.
Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Proof of Storage for
the Pay-As-You-Go Business Model
Proof of Storage (PoS) enables a cloud storage provider to prove that a client’s data is in-
tact. However, The existing PoS protocols are not designed for the pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
business model in which payment is made based on both storage volume and duration. In
this chapter, we propose two PoS protocols suitable for the novel payment model. The
first is a time encapsulated Proof of Retrievability (PoR) protocol that ensures retrievabil-
ity of the original file upon successful auditing by a client. Considering the large size of
outsourced data, we then extend the protocol to a privacy-preserving public auditing pro-
tocol which allows a third party auditor to audit outsourced data on behalf of its clients
without sacrificing the privacy of the data or the timestamp (i.e., time of storage). We
formalize the definition, system model and security model of the proposed PoS system
and prove the security of the proposed protocols by a sequence of games in the algebraic
group model with a random oracle. We analyze the performance of the protocols both
theoretically and experimentally and show that the protocols are practical.
4.1 Introduction
Cloud computing deals with massive volume of data via powerful computation resources
and elastic storage capability and brings significant benefits to cloud clients [38], such as
allowing on-demand access to the outsourced data and relieving clients from the burden
of local storage management and maintenance. However, it is also facing a range of
internal/external attackers who illegally access, delete or corrupt the outsourced data;
thus, it entails the security risks in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability of
the outsourced data and service. Among these security issues, the integrity of outsourced
data is of great importance, since the clients do not possess their outsourced data locally.
On the other hand, a cloud service provider (CSP) may be dishonest and attempts to hide
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data loss or corruption. For examples, the CSP might reclaim storage by discarding data
that have not been or are rarely accessed, or even hide data loss incidents to maintain
a reputation [29]. Thus it is crucial for clients to implement an effective mechanism to
perform periodical integrity checking over the outsourced data to ensure that it is intact in
the cloud [24].
Proof of Storage (PoS) is a generic primitive that allows a party to verify that the prover
actually stores a file intact [6]. There are two popular PoS models, provable data posses-
sion (PDP) [5, 7, 9, 27, 28, 48, 73, 77, 79] and proof of retrievability (PoR) [16, 45, 59, 61],
each has its pros and cons. PDP allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server
to verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model gen-
erates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks. PoR ensures
that a client can recover the entire file when an auditing is successful and is consider to be
more robust than PDP model for remote integrity checking in cloud. On the other hand,
considering the large size of outsourced data and client’s constraint on local storage capa-
bility, it is desirable to implement a public auditing protocol in which integrity checking is
performed by a third party auditor (TPA) while without revealing the client’s data during
the auditing process.
To impel cloud services like public utilities such as water, gas and electricity, it is ideal
to run the pay-as-you-go business model in which a client pays CSP based on the storage
volume and storage duration, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. It means a cloud client can
update his/her files stored in the cloud on different dates and the CSP will calculate the
cloud storage fee for each day according to the total volume occupied by the client on that
day.
The new payment model can be integrated with a proof of storage system to handle file
damage or corruption situations. The CSP has the responsibility to ensure the integrity
of the files stored in the cloud. If a file corruption is detected in a periodical integrity
checking, then the CSP should only charge the storage fee for that file until the last valid
checking. More specifically, there are three possible situations: the first case is that no
damage is detected in periodical integrity checking, then the client pay the bill in a regular
way; the second case is that an outsourced file is damaged and detected in the integrity
checking, then the storage charge will be counted by the date of the last successful check-
ing; the third case is the client removes a file from cloud storage, then the CSP calculates
the storage fee by this date. The above possible situations are shown in Figure 4.1.
However, to our knowledge, the existing PoS protocols only allow content integrity
checking. To cater the pay-as-you-go model, PoS protocols need to support integrity
checking of both content and timestamp (i.e., time of storage) of the outsourced data.
A trivial solution is to append a timestamp at the end of the outsourced data or using
special data blocks to store the timestamp. However, it has a loose relationship between
the timestamp and individual data blocks and the timestamp may be lost or corrupted.
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Figure 4.1: Cloud data integrity checking integrated into the Pay-As-You-Go business
model.
Another solution is that the file name and the timestamp can be incorporated to generate
an authentication tag for each block. This approach ensures a strong binding between
the timestamp and individual blocks but the timestamp has to be known by the verifier
which may be a privacy concern in the TPA setting. We should note that the timestamp
may leak some information related to the data via inference. For example, if the TPA
knows the date of a particular meeting, then from the timestamp the TPA is able to locate
the set of documents that contain the meeting minutes. This work presents new PoS
solutions that allow content and timestamp integrity checking without the aforementioned
limitations. Our proposed PoS schemes also have other potential applications such as
version control for outsourced data where the integrity of different versions of a file and
their corresponding timestamps can be guaranteed.
4.1.1 Related Work
The traditional data integrity checking techniques require a client to download an entire
data file or store some meta-data locally [24] and hence are not suitable for the cloud stor-
age setting. Considerable research under various security models have been carried out to
address integrity checking of outsourced data without requiring the client to have a local
copy or keep meta-data. Among them the most significant work are the PoR protocols
and the PDP protocols. In 2007, Juels and Kaliski [45] proposed the notion of PoR which
enables a (semi-trusted) storage server to produce a proof that the client can retrieve the
entire file. However, PoR is a position-care scheme in that the number of queries is re-
stricted by the number of sentinel blocks. Position-care means the integrity checking is
conducted by checking positions of the special blocks in the file. In the same year, Ate-
niese et al. [5] introduced the notion of PDP model and constructed two integrity checking
protocols which are based on RSA cyptosystem and homomorphic linear authenticators
(HLA). The two protocols can detect data corruption with high probabilities by checking
some random sampling blocks. Since then, HLA has been widely applied in the design of
many integrity checking protocols to achieve the blockless verification which dramatically
reduces the protocol overhead in computation and communication. Blockless verification
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enables integrity checking over the outsourced data to be conducted without giving the
data itself to the verifier. Inspired by [5], Shacham and Waters [59] proposed the com-
pact PoR protocols and proved their security of the PoRs by a sequence of games in the
random oracle model based on the intractability of Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem. For the purpose of achieving shortest query and response, they adopted the lin-
ear homomorphic property of BLS signatures [14] to construct the HLA. Later, Ateniese
et al. [6] introduced a formal transformation from homomorphic identification protocols
to the PoS protocols. In [6], the transformation requires the homomorphic identification
protocols equipped with three combination functions. However, the generic construction
is restricted by the combination algorithms, slightly differing from our construction. In
[19], the authors construct the PoS by combining the message-locked encryption scheme
and the Merkle Hash Tree. Their approach does not improve the efficiency or the security
of PoS.
In fact, the aforementioned protocols may potentially leak information to auditors dur-
ing the audit phase [73]. To address the privacy issue, Wang et al. [74] proposed the
first privacy-preserving public auditing protocol based on the work in [59] and the ran-
dom masking technique that the linear combination of sampled blocks in the response is
masked with randomness [74]. The TPA performs the public auditing tasks on behalf of
the clients. Furthermore, it cannot extract the original data during the audit phase, since
the data is hidden by a zero-knowledge proof. To improved the efficiency, Worku et al.
proposed a scheme [81]. Both [74] and [81] are vulnerable to existential forgeries using
known message attacks from the malicious CSP [21, 49]. To improved the privacy, a
privacy-enhanced protocol was introduced in [28] which achieves the indistinguishable
privacy but at the cost of significantly increased computational overhead. Recently, Liu
et al. [50] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol completely releases
data owners from online burden by regenerating code [17, 18]. A proxy is introduced
to generate authenticators. The audit is conducted by TPA. However, all the aforemen-
tioned privacy-preserving auditing mechanisms are content-only and cannot support the
validation of timestamp.
Recently, there are some works aiming to improve the efficiency of the integrity check-
ing service or offering a more user-friendly service, such as the lightweight privacy-
preserving public auditing via online/offline strategy [48, 79] and identity-based remote
integrity checking [75, 78, 86]. Additionally, some researchers became concerned to
the key-exposure problem. To address this problem, they proposed the key-exposure re-
silience auditing scheme and key update strategy [83, 84, 85]. Unfortunately, the afore-
mentioned works are also content-only integrity checking schemes and not yet offer any
effective and practical approach to support the validation of timestamp.
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Figure 4.2: System Model of PoS with/without TPA
4.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter we propose two PoS protocols designed for the pay-as-you-go business
model.
• We first present a PoR protocol which allows a client to verify the integrity of data
and its timestamp and ensures retrievability of the data upon successful auditing.
• We then propose a privacy-preserving public auditing protocol in which integrity
of outsourced data and the timestamp can be efficiently verified by a TPA while no
information on the content or the timestamp is leaked to the TPA.
• We show that both protocols are sound, i.e., they can detect any modification or
absence of the outsourced data with overwhelming probability. We prove their
security properties formally against the algebraic adversaries [42, 47] with a random
oracle.
• We compare our protocols with several related protocols in functionality and effi-
ciency, and conduct experiments to measure their performances. Both the theoreti-
cal comparison and the experimental results confirm that our protocols are efficient
for practical applications.
4.2 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.4, we introduce the system
architecture and security models. In Section 4.3, we provide some preliminaries. Then,
we give concrete description of our protocols with/without TPA in Section 4.5 and Sec-
tion 4.7, respectively. The theoretical comparison with related works and the experimental
evaluation are shown in Section 4.10. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 4.11.
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4.3 Preliminary
We work on bilinear groups generated by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm
G (λ ) that takes the security parameter λ as input. Our construction is built on type-3
bilinear group defined in Section 2.2.6.
Definition 21 (A Variant of Computational Diffie-Hellman (VoCDH) Assumption). [71]
Given (g,ga,g
1
a ,gb) ∈G41 it is hard to compute gab.
Definition 22 (Extended Discrete-Logarithm (Extended-DL) Assumption). Given (g1,gx1,
g2,g
1
x
2 ) ∈G21×G22 it is hard to compute x.
The VoCDH assumption is reducible to the extended-DL assumption. The VoCDH
solver sets gx1 = g
a, g2 = gc and g
1
x
2 = g
c
a , where c is chosen from Zp. If the extended-DL
solver can compute x that is equal to the value of a, the VoCDH solver can compute gab.
Definition 23 (Difference Lemma). Let A, B, F be events defined in some probability
distribution, and suppose that A∧¬F ⇐⇒ B∧¬F. Then |Pr[A]−Pr[B]| ≤ Pr[F].
4.4 System Model and Security Definition
In this section, we give the system architecture, algorithm definition and security model
of our protocols.
4.4.1 System Model
We consider two types of PoS protocols. In the first type of protocols, a cloud client
verifies integrity of the outsourced data and validity of the timestamp, while in the second
type, verification is performed by a TPA but without leaking any information to the TPA.
There are two parties in our PoS systems, namely the cloud client and the CSP. In the
second setting, the PoS system additionally involves a TPA. Each entity has its own obli-
gations and benefits. The CSP, for its own benefit, such as to maintain a good reputation,
might decide to hide data corruption incidents to cloud clients. However, we assume that
the CSP has no incentive to reveal the outsourced data to TPA. The cloud client in the
PoR protocol is to perform the auditing. While in public auditing, the TPA performs the
auditing on behalf cloud clients, but it is also curious on the content of outsourced data.
The system models with/without TPA are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The significant difference between our PoS protocols and the related works is that our
PoS protocols support the verification of timestamp in addition to the outsourced data,
which allows our protocols to be integrated with the PAYG business model.
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System Components. Based on the work of Ateniese et al.’s [6], a proof of storage sys-
tem Σ = (Setup,KeyGen,TagGen,GenProof,VerifyProof) is an interactive protocol that
allows a verifier to verify that a prover is faithfully storing a file.
Setup: This probabilistic algorithm takes the security parameter and generates system
parameters.
KeyGen: This probabilistic algorithm takes security parameter and public parameters and
generates a key-pair for a client.
TagGen: This probabilistic algorithm takes a secret key, a file and timestamp as input. It
processes the file to produce the encoded file and the auxiliary information including the
file tag and handles for data blocks.
GenProof,VerifyProof: The probabilistic algorithms executed by the prover P and verifier
V define a protocol for proving the integrity of stored data and the timestamp. During the
protocol execution, both P and V take the public key pk and a file tag τ generated by
TagGen as the input. P also takes the processed file and timestamp F∗, t̂, and the handles
{σ} as input. At the end of the protocol, V outputs 0 or 1, where 1 means that the file is
intact on the server. The protocol can be denoted as:
{0,1}←(V (pk,τ)
 P(pk,τ,F∗,{σ}, t̂)).
4.4.2 Design Goals
Our protocols are designed to achieve the following goals:
• Verifiability. The verifier is able to verify the integrity of the content and the vali-
dation of the timestamp simultaneously, by the proof from the CSP, without storing
a local copy.
Definition 24 (Verifiability). If the prover’s response is generated from the intact
file and timestamp, then the verification algorithm accepts the proof made by such
prover with overwhelming probability.
• Soundness. The CSP should not be able to produce a proof accepted by VerifyProof
without possession of the original outsourced data or timestamp.
We define the soundness of our protocol formally. The soundness is defined using
the following game between adversary A and challenger C .
Setup: C runs Setup and KeyGen to initial the environment. It gives public key to
A , keeping the private key to itself.
Tag Query: A adaptively issues queries. When receiving each query for a file and
a timestamp, C runs TagGen to get the output, and forwards the result to A .
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Proof-Verify Query: For any file on which it previously made a tag query, the ad-
versary can undertake executions of the proof of storage protocol. In these protocol
executions, C plays the part of the verifier and the adversary plays the part of the
prover.
Challenge: A finally outputs the description of a cheating prover P ′ for a new/-
modified file-timestamp pair different from those appeared in Tag Queries. C gen-
erates a challenge chal and requests P ′ to respond a proof.
Definition 25 (Soundness). A publicly verifiable PoS has soundness if the verifica-
tion algorithm accepts the proof produced by P ′ only with negligible probability.
• Retrievability. Informally, retrievability means the verifier is able to recover the
file when the prover can general proofs that can pass verification. We say a prover
P ′ is ε-admissible if it convincingly answers the verification challenges with ε
probability, i.e., if Pr[(V (pk,τ) P ′) = 1]≥ ε .
Definition 26 (Retrievability). [59] A PoS protocol with retrievability is ε-sound,
if there exists a polynomial-time extraction algorithm denoted Extr, such that for
any adversary that outputs an ε-admissible prover P ′ for a file M, Extr recovers M
from P ′ except with negligible probability.
• Content and Timestamp Privacy. The TPA should not be able to deduce data or
timestamp of the outsourced data from the response given by CSP. We define the
privacy of our PDP protocol formally. The content privacy agains TPA is defined
using the following game between adversary A and challenger C .
Setup: C runs Setup, KeyGen and TagGen to initial the environment. It gives the
public key to A , keeping the private key to itself. It also sends to A a list of public
information over the outsourced files, including file tags and timestamps.
Proof-Verify: C and A perform the proof-verify protocol. C acts as the prover to
generate the proof over the outsourced file after receiving the challenge from A .
At the end of the game, A outputs the content of a file. We say A wins the game
if A outputs the content correctly.
Definition 27 (Content Privacy). A publicly verifiable PoS has the content privacy if re-
ceiving the response, the verifier can recover the file content with negligible probability.
We also define the time privacy agains TPA formally. Setup and Proof-Verify are the
same as the defined game for the content privacy except that A is given the file contents
instead of timestamps. It finally outputs the timestamp of a file. We say A wins the game
if A outputs the correct timestamp.
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Definition 28 (Time Privacy). A publicly verifiable PoS has the time privacy if receiving
the response, the verifier can recover the timestamp with the probability no more than
1
#T + negl(k) where negl(·) denotes a negligible function and #T denotes the size of the
timestamp space.
4.5 Our Proposed PoR Protocol
Our PoR protocol follows the linear homomorphic authenticator structure used by the
previous constructions. However, one challenging issue we need to address is to embed
the timestamp in the authenticator such that it can prevent unauthorized modification of
the timestamp while maintaining the aggregation property.
Our PoS protocol under PoR model Ω=(Setup,KeyGen, TagGen,GenProof,VerifyProof)
consists of five algorithms which are as follows:
Setup(1λ ). It takes the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters including
bilinear groups (G1,G2,GT ) with prime order p and bilinear map e : G1×G2 → GT .
It sets g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 as generators of G1 and G2, respectively. It chooses collision-
resistant hash functions (CRHFs) H : {0,1}∗→G1 and H0 : {0,1}∗→Zp. It also chooses
an existentially unforgeable signature scheme Sig. Then it publishes the public parameters
pp = (G1,G2,GT ,e, p,g1,g2,H,H0,Sig).
KeyGen(1λ , pp). It takes the security parameter λ and public parameters pp. Then it out-
puts a pair of public/private key pk= (U,spk),sk= (α,ssk), where U = gα2 . (spk,ssk)
is the key pair of the signature scheme.
TagGen(F, t,sk). It takes the file F with timestamp t to be stored in the cloud and client’s
sk, and outputs the encoded file and timestamp (F∗, t̂), where t̂ = H0(t,Sigssk(t)). Then,
it breaks F∗ into blocks, where mi denotes the i-th block of F∗. Each block contains s
sectors that mi j denotes the j-th sector of i-th block . It chooses a random file name f name
from a sufficiently large domain and chooses s random elements u1,u2, · · · ,us ∈R Gs1.
Then compute the file tag denoted as τ = τ0||Sigssk(τ0), where τ0 = f name||n||u1|| · · · ||us.
Also, it generates σi as the handle to check that the CSP retains the corresponding block
later
σi = (H( f name||i) ·
s
∏
j=1
umi jj )
1
α+t̂ .
The CSP stores (F∗, t̂,τ,{σi}).
GenProof(Q,pk, t̂,{mi j},{σi}). The prover receives the c-element set {θi,νi} to be chal-
lenged, denoted as Q, where θi ∈R I, I is the indices set of blocks in file F∗ and νi is a
random number in Zp.
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Using the stored information, it computes a proof π =(ζ ,{µ j},R,RI,d). Let N denote
∏
c
k=1 νk and Ni denote ∏
c
k=1,k 6=i νk.
R = gr2, RI = g
1
r
1 , r ∈R Zp,
d = r+ t̂N ,
µ j =
c
∑
i=1
mθi jNi, 1≤ j ≤ s,
ζ =
c
∏
i=1
σ
1
νi
θi
, 1≤ i≤ c.
VerifyProof(Q,pk,π,τ). The verifier checks the validity of τ by spk and
e(RI,R) = e(g1,g2).
Then it verifies if
e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
uµ jj ,g2) = e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ).
It outputs 1 if the above equations are held. Otherwise, output 0.
4.5.1 Verifiability
The correctness of the above verification equation is clear.
e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
σ
1
νi
i ,g
t̂N
2 ·gαN2 )
= e(
c
∏
i=1
(H( f name||θi)
s
∏
j=1
u
mθi j
j )
1
νi ,gN2 )
= e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
uµ jj ,g2)
Note: There is an attack if the proof is without RI.
Specifically, the CSP randomly chooses d,{µ j} and lets R = gd−12 ·UN and ζ =
∏
c
i=1 H( f name||θi)Ni ∏sj=1 u
µ j
j . By this way, CSP can generate a proof (R,d,{µ j},ζ )
accepted by the verification algorithm without the knowledge of the stored data since
e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
uµ jj ,g2).
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This attack is caused by the CSP who does not need to prove the knowledge of the
discrete logarithm of R. Hence, we provide RI = g
1
r
1 to prove the knowledge of the discrete
logarithm of R [10].
4.6 Soundness against CSP
Theorem 3. If the signature scheme in our PoS is existentially unforgeable and the q-
SDH, DP assumptions hold in bilinear groups, then there is not any PPT adversary
against the soundness of our verification algorithm in the algebraic group model with
a random oracle, that causes VerifyProof to accept a PoS instance, except that it is com-
puted correctly.
Following the security proof provided by Shacham and Waters in [59], we define a se-
quence of games Game 0, Game 1, Game 2 and Game 3, played between the simulator
B and the adversary A . Before playing games, B initializes the environment by running
Setup.
Game 0. A interacts with B in the originally challenged game as defined in section 4.4.
Game 1. It is the same as Game 0 expect that if A submits a file tag that is valid but
not generated by B. B then declares failure and aborts. It implies that A can break the
underlying signature scheme.
Game 2. It is the same as Game 1, except that B keeps a list of its responses to A ’s
Tag Queries. B observes A ’s responses over prove-verify or in the test made of P ′. If
the adversary makes VerifyProof outputs 1 in any instance but the aggregated value ζ is
not equal to ∏(θi,νi)∈Q σ
1
νi
i , where Q is the challenge issued by B, B declares failure and
aborts.
Game 3. As in Game 2, the challenger tracks Tag Queries and observes proof of storage
protocol instances. This time, if in any of these instances the adversary is successful to
make VerifyProof accept but at least one µ j is not equal to the expected ∏(θi,νi)∈Q mθi jNi,
B declares failure and aborts.
Lemma 1. The difference in success probabilities between Game 0 and Game 1 is negli-
gible if the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Proof. If A submits a file tag on a file that is not generated by B, A successfully breaks
the existential unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme Sig. According to the
difference lemma, we have that |AdvGame0A −Adv
Game1
A | ≤ εSig.
Lemma 2. The difference in success probabilities between Game 1 and Game 2 is negli-
gible, if the q-SDH assumption holds in bilinear groups.
Before analyzing the difference in success probabilities between Game 1 and Game
2, we clarify some notation in order to present a summary. Supposed that A provides
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a proof π ′ = (ζ ′,{µ ′j},d,R,RI) of which ζ ′ 6= ζ = ∏(θi,νi)∈Q σ
1
νi
θi
that {(θi,νi)} are the
challenge with c elements. By the correctness of the verification, we gain an equation that
e(ζ ′,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2),
where N denotes ∏ck=1 νk and Ni denotes ∏
c
k=1,k 6=i νk.
We show the security of our protocol can be reduced to the q-SDH problem in the AGM
with random oracle. In the AGM, a forgery comes with a representation in the basis of all
responses to queries.
Proof. We show that if there is a non-negligible difference in success probabilities be-
tween Game 1 and Game 2, we can construct a simulator B that can solve the q-SDH
problem with non-negligible probability.
B is given a q-SDH problem instance (g1,gx1,g
x2
1 , · · · ,gx
q
1 ,g2,g
x
2) ∈ G
q+1
1 ×G22. Its goal
is to compute (c,g
1
x+c
1 )∈Zp×G1. There is an algebraic adversary A plays the game with
B when A is allowed to query hash values and group elements via oracles. B plays a
trick on H(·) to ensure that it can respond tag queries from adversary A successfully.
Setup. B sets g1,g2 as generators of G1 and G2. It sets U = gx2, then sends the public
key to A .
Tag query. A is allowed to query for q1, · · · ,qm. For each query qi, it runs as follows.
A sends a file F with the timestamp t as the input. B receives (F, t) and separates the
encoded file F∗ into n blocks. Then, for each block, it separates the block into s sectors,
that the mi j denotes the j-th sector of the block mi. It sets u j = g
γ j
1 (1 ≤ j ≤ s,γ j ∈ Zp)
and randomly chooses ri ∈ Zp to compute the hash value for i-th block
H( f name||i) =
gri( f (x)+ f (t̂))1
g
∑
s
j=1 γ jmi j
1
.
Here f (·) is a q-degree polynomial. f name is a random string to identify files. When
choosing a f name for a given file, it must be queried for the first time.
B gains the hash value of each block, then computes the corresponding tag and handles.
For each block mi, B computes
σi = (H( f name||i)
s
∏
j=1
umi jj )
1
x+t̂ = griF(x)1 ,
where F(x) = f (x)+ f (t̂)x+t̂ is a (q-1)-degree polynomial.
Proof-Verify. B interacts with A , if A submits a proof π ′ = (ζ ′,{µ ′j},d,R,RI) which
is accepted by the verification algorithm that is different from the expected proof. B
declares failure and aborts.
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Game 1 guarantees that the parameters associated with this protocol instance ( f name,n,
{u j},{mi j},{σi}) is generated by B; otherwise, execution would have already aborted.
A gets the group elements for a response
R = gr2g
xl
2 ∧RI = g
1
r+xl
1 ,
ζ ′ = ∏
qG
k=0 g
xkrk
1 ∏
qh
p=0 H
ap
p ∏
qt
e=0 σ
be
e
where qh, qG and qt are the number of responses that A gains from the hash oracle, group
oracle and tags. Let Hp denote the p-th response from the hash oracle. r, l,{ap} and
{be} compose representations of R,RI and ζ ′. If l 6= 0, (r/l,RI
1
l ) is the answer to the
q-SDH problem. Otherwise, as we argued before, by the correctness of the verification,
any response of A satisfies the equation that
e(ζ ′,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2)
= e(
c
∏
i=1
g
Nirθi( f (x)+ f (t̂))
1
g
Ni ∑
s
j=1 γ jmθi j
1
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2).
Therefore, we obtain that
e(ζ ′N ,g2)
= e(g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (x)+ f (t̂))+∑sj=1 γ j(µ
′
j−∑
c
i=1 Nimθi j
)
x+ d−rN
1 ,g2).
Let ∑sj=1 γ j(µ
′
j−∑ci=1 Nimθi j) be A.
ζ
′N = g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (x)+ f (t̂))+A
x+ d−rN
1
= g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)+
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN )+A
x+ d−rN
1 .
It is concluded that
g
1
x+ d−rN
1 =
 ζ ′N
g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)
1
 1∑ci=1 Nirθi ( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN )+A .
Therefore, B obtains the answer to the given q-SDH problem that
(
d− r
N
,(
ζ ′N
g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)
1
)
1
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN )+A ).
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Let E2 denote the event that the adversary queries a proof on the file which ζ ′ 6= ζ . Hence,
we have that |AdvGame2A −Adv
Game1
A | ≤ Pr[E2] = εq−SDH.
Lemma 3. The difference in success probabilities between Game 2 and Game 3 is negli-
gible, if the DP assumption holds in bilinear groups.
Game 2 guarantees that we have ζ ′ is equal to the expected result ζ . The only difference
in success probabilities is caused by {µ ′j}. A submits a proof π ′ = (ζ ,{µ ′j},d,R,RI)
which is accepted by the verification algorithm. By the correctness of the verification
algorithm, the equation is as follows
e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2) = e(ζ
′,
gd2
R
·UN ),
where N denotes ∏ck=1 νk and Ni denotes ∏
c
k=1,k 6=i νk. {(θi,νi)} are the challenge with
c elements from the verifier.
We prove the difference in success probabilities between Game 2 and Game 3 is negli-
gible if the DP assumption holds in bilinear groups.
Proof. B is given a DP problem instance (gr,gt) ∈ G21. Its goal is to find (R,T ) that
e(gr,R)e(gt ,T ) = 1 The only difference between Game 2 and Game 3 is to replace g1
with gr and u j with g
γ j
r g
ι j
t . It randomly chooses x ∈ Zp as the part of private key and
U = gx2 as a part of the public key. Then, it sends U to A . By the correctness of our
verification algorithm, B obtains that
e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2).
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It follows that
1 =e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni
s
∏
j=1
u
µ ′j
j ,g2)
e(ζ−1,
gd2
R
·UN )
=e(g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi−∑
s
j=1 γ j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
r ,g2)
e(g
∑
s
j=1 ι j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
t ,g2)
e(g
−∑ci=1
rθi
νi(x+t̂)
r ,
gd2
R
·UN )
=e(gt ,g
∑
s
j=1 ι j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
2 )
e(gr,(
gd2
R
·UN )−∑
c
i=1
rθi
νi(x+t̂) )
e(gr,g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi−∑
s
j=1 γ j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
2 ).
Let
R1 = (
gd2
R
·UN )−∑
c
i=1
rθi
νi(x+t̂) ,
R2 = g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi−∑
s
j=1 γ j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
2 ,
hence, the answer to the given DP problem instance is
(R1 ·R2,g
∑
s
j=1 ι j(∑
c
i=1 mθi j−µ
′
j)
2 ).
Let E3 denote the event that the adversary queries a proof on the file which at least one
µ ′j 6= µ j. Hence, we have that |AdvGame3A −Adv
Game2
A | ≤ Pr[E3] = εdp.
Wrapping up. From lemma 1, lemma 2 and lemma 3, by adopting difference lemma,
assuming the signature scheme is secure and the q-SDH and the DP assumptions hold in
bilinear groups, there is only a negligible difference in the success probabilities between
Game 3 and Game 0. This completes the proof of theorem 3.
4.6.1 Extractability
The extractability holds in our PoS under PoR model. It is to prove that the extraction
procedure can efficiently reconstruct a ρ fraction of the outsourced data when interact-
ing with a prover that provides correctly-computed {µ j} responses for a non-negligible
fraction of the query space. The above proofs guarantee that all adversaries that win the
soundness game with non-negligible probability output cheating provers that are well-
behaved. We say that a cheating prover is well-behaved if it never causes verification
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algorithm to accept in a prove-verify protocol instance except that is computed correctly.
The proof of the extractability of {µ j} over polynomial time queries is following the proof
of Theorem 4.3 in [59].
4.6.2 Retrievability
To retrieve the checking file, the verifier follows the method used in SW PoR [59]. Let
n be the number of blocks in the file. Suppose we use a ρ-rate erasure code, i.e., one
in which any ρ-fraction of the blocks success for decoding. Our proofs guarantee that
extraction will succeed from any adversary that convincingly answers an κ-fraction of
queries, provided that κ−ρ l−1/#{ν} is non-negligible in λ . It is this requirement that
guides the choice of parameters. A conservative choice is ρ = 1/2, l = λ and #{ν}= 2λ .
This guarantees extraction against any adversary. For applications that can tolerate a
larger error rate these parameters can be reduced.
Erasure codes provide the property [2] that the verifier is able to recover the entire file
with ρ fraction. Before storing it on the server, we would therefore like to encode an
n-block file into a 2n-block file or more when ρ is less than 12 . The traditional Reed-
Solomon style erasure codes can be constructed for arbitrary rates allowing recovery of
the original file [58].
4.7 Our Proposed Protocol with TPA
In some scenarios, the cloud clients may employ a third party to do the audit on behalf
of them in order to relieve the burden of doing periodical integrity checking. Meanwhile,
the third party should be blind to what it is checking. Therefore, proof of retrievability
is not suitable in this scenario. To satisfy the aforementioned requirement, we propose
another PoS protocol without retrievability. Our PoS protocol under PDP model Ω =
(Setup,KeyGen, TagGen,GenProof,VerifyProof) consists of five algorithms. The Setup
and KeyGen are the same as defined before in section 4.5.
TagGen(F, t,sk). It takes the file F with timestamp t to be stored in the cloud and client’s
sk, and outputs the encoded file and timestamp (F∗, t̂), where t̂ = H0(t,Sigssk(t)). Then,
it breaks F∗ into blocks, where mi denotes the i-th block of F∗. Each block contains s
sectors that mi j denotes the j-th sector of the i-th block. For simplicity, in this scheme we
assume s = 1. We then compute the file tag and block handles as follows. It chooses a
random file name f name from a sufficiently large domain and chooses a random element
u ∈R G1. Then compute the tag denoted as τ = τ0||Sigssk(τ0), where τ0 = f name||n||u.
Also, it computes σi as the handle for mi as follows
σi = (H( f name||i) ·umi)
1
α+t̂ .
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The CSP stores (F∗, t̂,τ,{σi}).
GenProof(Q,pk, t̂,{mi},{σi}). The prover receives the c-element set {θi,νi} to be chal-
lenged, denoted as Q, where θi ∈R I, where I is the indices set of blocks in file F∗ and νi
is the prime chosen randomly in Zp. It computes a proof π = (ζ ,A,AI,µ,R,RI,d). Let
N denote ∏ck=1 νk and Ni denote ∏
c
k=1,k 6=i νk.
A = ga2, AI = g
1
a
1 , a ∈R Zp,
µ = a+
c
∑
i=1
mθiNi,
R = gr2, RI = g
1
r
1 , r ∈R Zp,
d = r+ t̂N ,
ζ =
c
∏
i=1
σ
1
νi
θi
, 1≤ i≤ c.
VerifyProof(Q,pk,π,τ). The verifier checks the validity of τ by spk and verifies if
e(AI,A) = e(g1,g2)∧ e(RI,R) = e(g1,g2).
Then it verifies whether
e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ ,g2) = PA · e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN )
when PA = e(u,A). It outputs 1 if the above equations are held. Otherwise, output 0.
The correctness of the above verification equation is clear.
PA · e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
σ
1
νi
θi
,gt̂N2 ·gαN2 )
= e(ua ·
c
∏
i=1
umθiNi,g2)·
e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni,g2)
= e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ ,g2)
4.8 Soundness against CSP
We prove that the CSP is unable to generate a valid response to the TPA without storing
the file and timestamp as it should be.
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Theorem 4. If the signature scheme in our protocol is existentially unforgeable and the
q-SDH, DP assumption hold in bilinear groups, then, there is not any PPT adversary
against the soundness of our verification algorithm in the algebraic group model with a
random oracle, that causes VerifyProof to accept a PoS instance, except that it is com-
puted correctly.
We define Game 0, Game 1 and Game 2 played between the simulator B and the
adversary A to prove that our PoS under PDP model is sound against malicious CSP.
Before playing games, B initial the environment by running Setup.
Game 0. A interacts with B in the challenged game as defined in the soundness game.
Game 1. It is the same as Game 0 expect that If A submits a file tag that is valid but not
generated by B, B declares failure and aborts.
The difference in success probabilities between Game 0 and Game 1 is negligible if the
signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Game 2. It is the same as Game 1, except that if A makes VerifyProof outputs 1 in any
proof instance but the aggregated value ζ ′ is not equal to ∏(θi,νi)∈Q σ
1
νi
θi
, where Q is the
challenge issued by B, B declares failure and aborts.
Game 3. As in Game 2, the challenger tracks Tag Queries and observes proof of storage
protocol instances. This time, if in any of these instances the adversary is successful to
make VerifyProof accept but at least one µ is not generated honestly, B declares failure
and aborts.
Lemma 4. The difference in success probabilities between Game 1 and Game 2 is negli-
gible, if the q-SDH assumption holds in bilinear groups in AGM with a random oracle.
Proof. Supposed that A provides a proof π ′ = (ζ ′,A,AI, µ,R,RI,d) of which ζ ′ 6=
∏(θi,νi)∈Q σ
1
νi
θi
. By the correctness of the verification, we have the following equations
e(AI,A) = e(g1,g2)∧ e(RI,R) = e(g1,g2)∧
e(u,A) · e(ζ ′,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ ,g2),
where N denotes ∏ck=1 νk and Ni denotes ∏
c
k=1,k 6=i νk. {(θi,νi)} are the challenge with
c elements from the verifier.
We show that if there is a non-negligible difference in success probabilities between
Game 1 and Game 2, we can construct a simulator B that can solve the q-SDH problem
with non-negligible probability.
B is given a q-SDH problem instance (g1,gx1,g
x2
1 , · · · , gx
q
1 ,g2,g
x
2). Its goal is to compute
(c,g
1
x+c
1 )∈Zp×G1. An algebraic adversary A plays the game with B when A is allowed
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to query hash values and group elements via oracles. B plays a trick on H(·) to ensure
that it can respond tag queries from adversary A successfully.
Setup. B sets g1,g2 as the generators in this game and public key U = gx2. Then it returns
the public key to A .
Tag query. A is allowed to query for q1, · · · ,qm. For each query qi, it runs as follows.
A sends the file with the timestamp (F, t) as the input. B receives (F, t) and separates
the encoded file F∗ into n blocks. Then, for each block mi, it randomly chooses ri ∈ Zp
to computes the hash value for the i-th block
H( f name||i) =
gri( f (x)+ f (t̂))1
gγmi1
.
where u = gγ1,γ ∈ Zp, f (·) is a q-degree polynomial. f name is a random string to identify
a file.
B gains the hash value of each block, then computes the corresponding tag and handles.
For each block mi, B computes
σi = (H( f name||i)umi)
1
x+t̂ = griF(x)1 ,
where F(x) = f (x)+ f (t̂)x+t̂ is a (q-1)-degree polynomial.
Proof-Verify. Game 1 guarantees that the parameters associated with this protocol in-
stance ( f name,n,u,mi,{σi}) is generated by B; otherwise, execution would have already
aborted. A responds a proof that,
A = ga2g
xl1
2 , AI = g
1
a+xl1
1 ,
R = gr2g
xl2
2 , RI = g
1
r+xl2
1 ,
ζ
′ =
qG
∏
k=0
gx
krk
1
qh
∏
p=0
Happ
qt
∏
e=0
σ
be
e .
qh, qG and qt are the number of responses that A gains from the hash oracle, group oracle
and tag query. Let Hp denote the p-th response from the hash oracle. a, l1,r, l2,{ap}
and {be} compose representations of A,AI,R,RI and ζ ′. Either l1 or l2 is not equal to 0,
(a/l1,AI
1
l1 ) or (r/l2,RI
1
l2 ) is an answers to the given q-SDH problem instance. Otherwise,
as we argued before, by the correctness of the verification, any response of A satisfy the
equation that
e(u,A) · e(ζ ′,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ ,g2).
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Then B is able to compute
e(ζ ′,gd−r+xN2 )
= e(g
∑
c
i=1 Ni(rθi( f (x)+ f (t̂))−γmθi)+γ(µ
′−a)
1 ,g2).
Hence, the equation shows that e(ζ ′N ,g2) is equal to
e(g
∑
c
i=1 Ni(rθi
( f (x)+ f (t̂))−γmθi )+γ(µ
′−a)
x+(d−r)/N
1 ,g2).
Let γ(µ ′−a∑ci=1 Nimθi) be A.
ζ
′N = g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (x)+ f (t̂))+A
x+ d−rN
1
= g
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (x)+ f ( d−rN ))+∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN ))+A
x+ d−rN
1
= g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)+
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN ))+A
x+ d−rN
1 .
Hence, we obtain that
g
1
x+ d−rN
1 = (
ζ ′N
g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)
1
)
1
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN ))+A .
Therefore, B obtains the answer to the given q-SDH problem
(
d− r
N
,(
ζ ′N
g
∑
c
i=1 NirθiF(x)
1
)
1
∑
c
i=1 Nirθi
( f (t̂)− f ( d−rN ))+A ).
Hence, we have that |AdvGame2A −Adv
Game1
A | ≤ εq−SDH.
Lemma 5. The difference in success probabilities between Game 2 and Game 3 is negli-
gible, if the DP assumption holds in bilinear groups.
Game 2 guarantees that we have ζ ′ is equal to the expected result ζ . The only difference
in success probabilities is caused by µ ′. A submits a proof π ′ = (ζ ,µ ′,d,R,RI) which is
accepted by the verification algorithm. By the verification equation
e(u,A) · e(ζ ,
gd2
R
·UN ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ
′
,g2),
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we can obtain an equation that is
1 = e(ζ−1,
gd2
R
·UN )e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Ni,g2)e(u,
gµ
′
2
A
).
The proof for lemma lemma 5 is similar to the proof for lemma 3. Hence, we have that
|AdvGame3A −Adv
Game2
A | ≤ Pr[E3] = εdp.
4.9 Content/Time Privacy against TPA
Theorem 5. There is not any adversary against the content/time privacy in our PDP
protocol if the extended-DL problem is intractable and the signature scheme Sig is secure.
Proof. We prove that the TPA cannot learn any information of the content or timestamp
from the CSP’s response.
In our proof, we show that there does not exist any PPT adversary who can recov-
ery the content or timestamp if the signature scheme Sig is secure and the extended-DL
assumption holds.
Let ψ :G2→G1 denote an isomorphism. The aggregated value of the content ∑i=1c Nimθi
is represented as M, where Ni denotes ∏ck=1,k 6=i νk. {(θi,νi)} are the challenge with c el-
ements from the verifier.
Case 1. A has the knowledge of timestamp t̂ ′. We prove that our protocol will not reveal
the content under the extended-DL assumption.
In this case, we show the simulator can produce a valid response even without the
knowledge of the content in random oracle model. Now, A is treated as a verifier. Given
a challenge from A , S sets that A = gzx2 and AI = g
1
zx
1 ,z ∈ Zp. Then, it randomly picks
µ,r from Zp. d is computed with t̂ and r that d = r+N t̂. It sets u = gru1 and U = g
xsk
2 ,
where ru,xsk ∈ Zp. S sets the value of ζ via the correctness equation
e(u,A) · e(ζ ,gd−r+xskN2 ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµ ,g2)
which gives
e(ζ ,gd−r+xskN2 ) = e(
c
∏
i=1
H( f name||θi)Niuµψ(A)−ru,g2)
where N = ∏ck=1 νk.
Hence, ζ = (∏ci=1 H( f name||θi)Niuµψ(A)−ru)
1
d−r+xskN . Therefore, if A can recover
the content, S can compute x = µ−Mz in this condition.
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Case 2. A has the knowledge of the content. We prove that the protocol will not reveal
the timestamp due to the security of the signature scheme Sig.
In this case, we prove that the TPA cannot recover the timestamp with the probability
more than 1#T + εSig. We prove the time privacy via the following games.
Game 0. The game is the challenged game.
Game 1. The difference between Game 1 and Game 0 is that if A sends any hash query
to H0 where the hash input Sigssk(t) is not generated by S before, the game will be
terminated. It means A can break the unforgeability of the signature scheme Sig. Thus,
|Pr[Game 1]−Pr[Game 0]|= εSig.
Game 2. S choose t̂ from Zp. The probability is the same for Game 1 and Game 2 (when
H0 is modeled as a random oracle). The probability of adversary in Game 2 is 1#T since
the simulation is not related to the timestamp t, so the chance the adversary can obtain t
is 1#T . The probability overall is no more than
1
#T + εSig. This completes the proof.
4.10 Performance
4.10.1 Theoretical Comparison
We summarize the computation cost of our protocols in Table II, which also shows a
comparison among our protocols, Wang et al. scheme [73] and the SW PoR scheme [59]
over efficiency and functionality.
Computation.
The bilinear pairings P, exponentiation E1 and multiplication M1 on G1, and expo-
nentiation E2 and multiplication M2 on G2 contribute most computation cost. The other
operations are much faster, such as hash function and the operations on finite fields.
Thus, we only consider bilinear pairings on bilinear groups, exponentiation, and multi-
plication on G1 and G2.
In audit phase of our PoR protocol, to generate a response on a challenge given by
verifier, GenProof needs c+ 1 exponentiation and c− 1 multiplication on G1, and 1 ex-
ponentiation on G2, respectively. VerifyProof needs c+ s exponentiation and c+ s− 2
multiplication on G1, 1 exponentiation and 1 multiplication on G2, and 3 bilinear pair-
ings on bilinear groups. In audit phase of our PDP protocol, GenProof needs c+ 2 ex-
ponentiation and c− 1 multiplication on G1, and 2 exponentiation on G2, respectively.
VerifyProof needs c+1 exponentiation and c+1 multiplication on G1, 2 exponentiation
and 2 multiplication on G2, and 5 bilinear pairings on bilinear groups.
Communication. In PoR, we use the aggregated tags as the response in our protocol,
such that CSP returns π = (ζ ,{µ j},d,R,RI). The communication cost is of bit length
|G2|+2∗|G1|+(s+1)∗|Zp|. We adopted the type f elliptic curve to generate our system.
The group element in G1 is of 160-bit and the group element in G2 is of 320-bit. Zp
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Table 4.1: COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION AND PROPERTIES
Scheme GenProof VerifyProof Retrievable Privacy-Preserving Timestamp
[59] cE1 +(c+1)M1 2P+(c+ s)E1 +(c+ s−1)M1
√
N/A ×
[73] P+ cE1 +(c−1)M1 2P+(c+3)E1 +(c+1)M1 ×
√
×
Our PoR (c+1)E1 +(c−1)M1 +E2 3P+(c+ s)E1 +(c+ s−2)M1 +2E2 +2M2
√
N/A
√
Our PDP (c+2)E1 +(c−1)M1 +2E2 5P+(c+1)E1 +(c+1)M1 +2E2 +2M2 ×
√ √
contains elements of 160-bit. In our experiments, we set the number of sector s in each
block as 128. Thus the communication cost of the response is of bit length 21280 = 320+
2∗160+160∗129 for the PoR protocol. In PDP, the communication cost of the response
is of bit length 2 ∗ |G2|+ 3 ∗ |G1|+ 2 ∗ |Zp| when s is set to 1. Thus the communication
cost of the response is of bit length 1440 = 2∗320+3∗160+2∗160.
Storage. In both PoR and PDP, for each file CSP stores the file tag τ and handles {σi}n1
for the data blocks, making the storage overhead to be roughly (n+ s)∗ |G1|. During the
experiments, we used files containing 500 blocks, 1000 blocks and 5000 blocks, which
gives the storage overhead of 12KB, 22KB and 100KB, respectively.
4.10.2 Experimental Result
We implement the prototype of our protocol and evaluate the time cost in audit phase. The
implementation was conducted on a notebook with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8
GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM. We use Java 1.8 and JPBC to implement the cryptographic
algorithm. The implementation is done using type f elliptic curve. For more details about
the curve, please refer to [8]. For 80-bits security, only 160 bits are needed to represent
elements of G1, and 320 bits for G2a.
In our experiments, we evaluated the performance of our protocols in audit phase by
setting the number of the sampling blocks from 0 to 500. As expected, the computation
time grows linearly as the verifier requests more sampling blocks. The comparisons be-
tween our protocols, the SW PoR [59] and the privacy-preserving PDP of Wang et al. [73]
are given in fig. 4.3 and fig. 4.4.
Detection Rate. Assume the CSP hosts a n-block file, out of which x blocks are cor-
rupted. The verifier checks the integrity of the entire file containing n blocks by randomly
sampling c different blocks. In the experiment, we show detection probabilities for 1%,
5%, 10% and 20% corruption rates, respectively. Let Px denote the detection rate
Px = 1− (n− x)(n−1− x) · · ·(n− c+1− x)
n(n−1) · · ·(n− c+1)
.
When the corruption rate is of 1%, generating a proof with 400 blocks from a file with
500 blocks can detect such corruption with 99.9% probability. The probability will be
declined to 99.4% when such file contains 5000 blocks.
aType F internals. URL: https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/manual/ch08s08.html.
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Figure 4.3: Time Cost of GenProof
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Figure 4.4: Time Cost of VerifyProof
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When the corruption rate is of 5%, generating a proof with 380 blocks from a 500-
block file provides the detection rate close to 1. When the file contains 1000 blocks, the
detection rate of sampling 100 blocks is close to 99.4%. When sampling 80 blocks from
a 5000-block file, the detection rate is 98.4%.
When the corruption rate is of 10%, to achieve the detection rate close to 1, the proof
should contain 260 blocks, 300 blocks and 360 blocks on the 500-block file, 1000-block
file and 5000-block file, respectively.
When the corruption rate is of 20%, to achieve the detection rate close to 1, the proof
should contain 140 blocks, 160 blocks and 180 blocks on the 500-block file, 1000-block
file and 5000-block file, respectively.
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Figure 4.5: Detection Rate on 500-block File
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Figure 4.6: Detection Rate on 1000-block File
4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce a new Proof of Storage paradigm that supports the PAYG
business model. We propose two protocols, one allows data retrievability by the owner
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Figure 4.7: Detection Rate on 5000-block File
while the other supports public auditing by a third party auditor. Both protocols allow a
verifier to check the integrity of the data content and the associated timestamp simultane-
ously. We prove that the two protocols are both sound and the protocol supporting third
party auditing is privacy-preserving with regards to the data content and the timestamp.
The performance analysis and experiment also demonstrate that our proposed protocols
are efficient and practical.
Chapter 5
Privacy-enhanced Remote Data
Integrity Checking with Updatable
Timestamp
None of the existing works have considered the client’s control over changes in storage
duration. In this chapter, we propose an RDIC scheme to simultaneously check the data
content and storage duration represented by an updatable timestamp via the third-party au-
ditor (TPA). Also, our proposed scheme achieves indistinguishable privacy (IND-privacy)
against TPA for both data content and timestamp. To bind the content and timestamp in
the authenticator and support efficient timestamp update, we construct the authenticator
with the randomizable structure-preserving signature (SPS). Additionally, we utilize the
Groth-Sahai proof and range proof to provide the IND-privacy and guarantee the times-
tamp validation in the auditing phase. We formalize the definition and security model and
provide the formal proof of our scheme. We also present the theoretical and experimental
performance analysis to demonstrate that our scheme is comparable to the previous RDIC
schemes which do not consider the storage time.
5.1 Introduction
In practice, the cloud clients may also prefer to employ a third party auditor (TPA) to
check the integrity of their outsourced data. There are two cases: the first case is that data
corruption/damage is detected, then the CSP calculates the storage fee by the time of the
last successful integrity checking; the second case is that the client determines to stop the
cloud storage service, then the CSP calculates the storage fee by the service ending date.
These cases are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
To support the PAYG pricing model, a full-fledged RDIC protocol should provide the
data integrity and timestamp validation simultaneously. Moreover, it should also support
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Figure 5.1: Two Cases in the PAYG Pricing Model for Cloud Storage: Case 1 is the data
corruption, in which the client will pay the storage fee until the last successful integrity
checking. Case 2 is the service termination, in which the storage fee is calculated by
the cloud storage termination date. If the above two cases do not happen, the periodical
payment will be done for each payment circle.
efficient renewal of the storage service by updating the timestamp. However, the previous
works only allow a party to verify the content integrity of the outsourced data [6, 5, 7, 9,
27, 28, 48, 73, 77, 79].
It is not trivial to construct a RDIC scheme supporting timestamp validation and update
by directly modifying the existing RDIC schemes. The trivial solution is that the CSP
sends the timestamp to the verifier for verification, which, however, has the drawback
that the timestamp has to be revealed to the verifier and is not suitable in the third party
auditing setting where the TPA should not learn any information about the data storage
including the timestamp in order to avoid any inference attacks that may be performed by
the TPA to infer the data content. Moreover, how to allow the timestamp to be efficiently
updated in order to allow clients to renew their storage duration is a challenging problem.
The trivial solution is to compute new authenticators with the new timestamp. However,
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the client has to download all the data in order to update the authenticators, which is
impractical. Also, to reduce the computation burden on the client’s side, it is ideal to
allow the CSP to update the authenticators for the new timestamp.
5.1.1 Related Work
Checking data integrity by downloading the whole data or storing some data locally is im-
practical the cloud storage [24]. There are some RDIC schemes attempted to addressing
the integrity issue in the cloud environment with the optimized cost of resources. In 2007,
Juels and Kaliski [45] introduced PoR protocol which enables the (semi-trusted) third-
party server to produce proof as evidence on possessing the file integrity. It requires that
the clients store some meta-data to verify the proof provided by the server. Their protocol
is position-care. The query number is restricted by the size of assistant blocks. It is a po-
tential solution for addressing the data integrity checking in the cloud. Another potential
is introduced by Ateniese et al. [5]. They construct the integrity checking protocol based
on RSA cryptosystem and homomorphic linear authenticators (HLA). It detects the data
corruption by sampling some blocks to generate the proof. By using HLA architecture, it
achieves the blockless verification which dramatically reduces the overheads of compu-
tation and communication during checking the data integrity. Shacham and Waters [59]
proposed the improved PoR protocols with public verification. They prove the security
of PoR by a sequence of games in the random oracle model based on the intractability of
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. For the purpose of achieving the shortest
query and response, they adopt the linear homomorphic property of BLS signatures [14]
to construct the HLA.
The aforementioned protocols may potentially leak information to auditors during data
integrity checking [73]. To address the privacy issue, Wang et al. [74] proposed the first
privacy-preserving public auditing protocol by using the random masking technique, in
which the auditor performs the public auditing on behalf of the clients without leaking the
data encapsulated by a zero-knowledge proof.
To improve the efficiency, Liu et al. [50] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing
protocol completely releases data owners by delegating the authenticator’s generation to
a proxy. To enhance the privacy, a privacy-enhanced protocol was introduced in [28],
where the protocol achieves the indistinguishable privacy. The aforementioned privacy-
preserving auditing mechanism is content-only and cannot support the validation of times-
tamp, so they cannot be applied to the cloud storage system supporting the pay-as-you-go
business model.
Additionally, some recent works also take the malicious auditor [87] into consideration,
in which the auditor and server will collude. The strategy to address the collusion between
auditor and server is to place an additional checking process between auditor and clients.
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The “malicious” auditor also is called procrastinating auditor in [4].
5.1.2 Contribution
In this chapter, we present an RDIC scheme that can achieve both data and timestamp
integrity checking while overcoming the aforementioned challenges.
1. Our RDIC protocol provides the content and timestamp checking to ensure the val-
idation of the storage volume and duration of the outsourced data. We construct an
authenticator to tightly bind the relation between the data content and timestamp,
allowing timestamp validation to be done during the data integrity checking.
2. During auditing, the timestamp and the content will not be revealed to the TPA. The
TPA cannot infer the data content or timestamp involved in the protocol. To achieve
indistinguishability privacy, We adopt the structure-preserving signature (SPS) in
constructing the authenticators and the Groth-Sahai proof system in generating the
auditing proofs. In addition, to allow timestamp validity checking, we adopt the
range proof system to prove the timestamp is in a specific range without disclosing
it to TPA.
3. When clients update the authenticators with a new timestamp, the client side just
needs to perform a partial light-weight computation and the rest of computation for
generating new authenticators will be conducted by CSP. By randomizing the sig-
nature which is used to construct our authenticator, the clients only need to generate
an update tag and the rest computation can be done by the CSP.
4. We conduct the experiments to test the efficiency of our scheme and also compare
the performance of our protocol with related works. Both the theoretical compari-
son and the experimental analysis confirm that our protocol provides strong security
with acceptable performance.
5.2 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.3, we introduce some pre-
liminaries. Then, we give an explanation of the system architecture, security model in
Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we describe a generic construction of RDIC protocol and
provide an instantiation of our generic construction. In Section 5.6, we formally prove its
security and privacy. The theoretical comparison with related works and the experiment
evaluation are shown in Section 5.7. Finally, we conclude our work.
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5.3 Preliminary
We work on bilinear groups generated by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm
G (λ ) that takes the security parameter λ as input. Our construction is built on type-3
bilinear group defined in Section 2.2.6. Our scheme will rely on the Symmetric External
Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. In Type-3 pairings, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem is hard in both groups G1 and G2.
5.3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
In this part, we introduce some primitives used to construct our authenticator and protocol.
Definition 29 (Structure-preserving Signature (SPS) [1]). A signature scheme (Setup,
KeyGen,Sign,Veri f y) is said to be structure preserving over bilinear group if system pa-
rameter pp includes bilinear groups (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) generated by bilinear group
generator, group elements in G1 and G2, and constants in Zp. The verification key con-
sists of pp and group elements in G1 and G2. The messages consist of group elements in
G1 and G2, the signatures consist of group elements in G1 and G2, and the verification
algorithm only needs to decide membership in G1 and G2, and evaluate pairing product
equations.
We review the structure preserving signature with randomization property in [34]. The
SPS consist of five algorithms (SPS.Setup,SPS.KeyGen,SPS.Sign, SPS.Verify,SPS.Rand) :
SPS.Setup(1λ ): Take the security parameter 1λ as input. It outputs the system parameter
pp including the bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) and the finite file Zp. Let e :
G1×G2→GT be a pairing where G1,G2 and GT have order p. g,h are fixed generators
of G1,G2, respectively.
SPS.KeyGen(pp): Take the system parameter pp as input. It outputs a pair of sign-
ing/verification key sk/vk that sk keeps secret and vk is published. The secret key is
{xi}i∈{1,l},y ∈ Zp. The public key is ({Xi},Y ) where Xi = gxi and Y = hy.
SPS.Sign(M,sk): Take the system parameter pp, message M = ((M1,N1), · · · , (Ml,Nl))
and the signing key sk as input. It outputs the signature σ = (σ1,σ2). To sign M ∈ G2,
select r ∈ Zp and compute σ1 = gr,σ2 = (∏li=1 N
xi
i ·Y x1h)
1
r . The signature on M is
(σ1,σ2).
SPS.Verify(M,vk,σ): Take the system parameter pp, message M, the verification key vk
and signature σ as input. It outputs 1 if they pass the verification algorithm. Otherwise, it
outputs 0. To verify a signed message (M,σ), check via the equations that
e(σ1,σ2) =
l
∏
i=1
e(Xi,Ni) · e(X1,Y )e(g,h).
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SPS.Rand(σ): Take the signature as input. Select r′ ∈Zp. Return σ =(σ r
′
1 ,σ
1
r′
2 ). It is said
to be (perfectly) randomizable if there exists a randomization algorithm Rand such that
for all interactive adversaries A , given a pair of signature and randomized signature, the
advantage of guessing whether the signature to be verified is the original or randomized
is negligible.
Definition 30 (Groth-Sahai Proof System [35]). The Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system is a
non-interactive proof system. The GS proofs that are secure under the SXDH assumption,
which is the most efficient instantiation of the proof system that prove the knowledge of
witnesses to pairing-product equation of the form
n
∏
j=1
e(A j,Yj)
m
∏
i=1
e(Bi,Xi)
m
∏
i=1
n
∏
j=1
e(Xi,Yj)
γi, j =
k
∏
l=1
e(Gl,Hl),
where Xi,Yj are the witnesses and the rest part are public constants, that {Ai,B j} ∈G1.
The Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system GS consists of four algorithms (GS.Setup,
GS.CRS,GS.Prove,GS.Verify).
GS.Setup(1λ ): Take the security parameter as input. It outputs the system parameter gk
including the description of a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2).
GS.CRS(gk): Take the system parameters as input. It outputs the common reference string
crs.
GS.Prove(crs,x,w): Take the common reference string crs, a value x and the witness w of
x as input. It outputs a proof π .
GS.Verify(crs,x,π): Take the common reference string crs, a value x and π as input. It
outputs 1 if the pairing-product equation holds over the input. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
The proof system has completeness, soundness, witness-indistinguishability and zero-
knowledge. Readers are referred to [40] for details.
Definition 31 (Commitment [68]). (Gen,Com,Ver) is a commitment scheme if:
• efficiency: Gen,Com,Ver are polynomial-time algorithms;
• completeness: for all m it holds that
Pr
[
crs← Gen(λ );(com,dec)←Com(crs,m) :
Ver(crs,com,dec,m) = 1
]
= 1
• binding: for any polynomial-time algorithm sender there is a negligible function ε
such that for all sufficiently large λ it holds that
Pr
[
crs← Gen(λ );(com,m0,m1,dec0,dec1)← sender(crs) :
Ver(crs,com,dec0,m0) =Ver(crs,com,dec1,m1) = 1∧m0 6= m1
]
≤ ε(λ )
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• hiding: for any adversary receiver there is a negligible function ε such that for all
m0,m1 where |m0|= |m1| and all sufficiently large λ it holds that
Pr
[
crs← Gen(λ );b←{0,1};(com,dec)←Crs(crs,mb) :
b← receiver(m0,m1,com)
]
≤ 1
2
+ ε(λ )
We review the Pedersen commitment [57] that works as follows:
• Gen(λ ): it sets up the scheme by generating a set of common parameters pp. It
chooses two primes p and q which are sufficiently large. Then it randomly selects
two generators g and h of subgroup Gq of Z∗p.
• Com(pp,m): to commit m ∈ Zq, the committer chooses a random value r ∈ Zq and
computes commitment c ∈ Z∗p by c = Com(m,r) = gmhr mod p. Note that under
the assumption that logg h is unknown to the committer, it needs to have knowledge
of the opening values m and r to open commitment c.
• Ver(c,m,r): to verify c is a commitment to m with the opening value r, it computes
gmhr and check whether c is equal to the result.
• Open(c,m,r): it takes as input a commitment c, message m, and opening value
r, and returns m, if c is a valid commitment to m, with opening value r, i.e. c =
Com(m,r), and > if not.
Definition 32 (Range Proof System (RPS)[15, 56]). Let C = (Gen,Com,Ver,Open) be
the key generation, the commit and the open algorithms of a commitment scheme. For an
instance I, a range proof with respect to commitment scheme C and range Φ is a proof of
knowledge for the following statement:
PoK{(σ ,ρ) : I← Com(σ ;ρ)∧σ ∈Φ}.
Below we review the RPS applied in [56], which is based on the ring signature to prove
a committed value lies within a certain range. For example, to prove b = b020 + b121 +
· · ·+bn−12n−1 in the range [0,2n) for some n, a prover computes Pedersen commitments
Ci for bi2i and generates a ring signature for the ring (Ci,Ci/h2
i
) for all i. We have built
up the number in binary, and a n-bit number can only be in the range [0,2n).
We review the ring signature used in [56]. It runs with a set of private/public key pair
(x ji ,P
j
0 ,P
j
1 ), for i ∈ {0,1}, j ∈ {0,n− 1}, where P
j
0 = C j,P
j
1 = C j/h
2 j and generates the
ring signatures as follows:
• For each j = 0, · · · ,n−1
– Set α j as a random number and L
j
i = g
α j .
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– Set c ji′ = Hs(L
j
i ), where Hs is a cryptographic hash function, and i
′ = i+ 1
mod 2.
– Set s ji′ as a random number and compute L
j
i′ = g
s j
i′P ji′
c j
i′ .
– Set c ji = Hs(L
j
i′) and compute s
j
i = α j− c
j
i x
j
i .
• Return {(L j0,s
j
1)} and s = ∑ j s
j
0.
The verifier with (P j0 ,P
j
1 ,L
j
0,s
j
1) for j = 0, · · · ,n−1 and s verifies the signatures as follows:
• For all j, compute c j1 = Hs(L
j
0), L
j
1 = g
s j1P j1
c j1 , c j0 = Hs(L
j
1).
• If ∏n−1j=0 L
j
0 = g
s ·∏n−1j=0 P
j
0
c j0 then return 1. Otherwise, return 0.
To ensure that the commitments {Ci}n−10 on {bi2i}
n−1
0 , that {bi2i}
n−1
0 are derived from
b, the prover needs to give an additional proof to show that ∏n−1i=0 Ci/C is a commitment
to zero, where C is a commitment to b. That is,
n−1
∏
i=0
Ci = g∑
n−1
i=0 xih∑
n−1
i=0 bi2
i
,
since we have b = b020 +b121 + · · ·+bn−12n−1,
n−1
∏
i=0
Ci/C =
g∑
n−1
i=0 xih∑
n−1
i=0 bi2
i
gxhb
=
g∑
n−1
i=0 xi
gx
= g∑
n−1
i=0 xi−x.
Generic algorithms. In a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1, g2) generated by the group
generator, we refer to deciding group membership, computing group operations in G1,G2
or GT , comparing group elements and evaluating the bilinear map as the generic bilinear
group operations. The signature scheme we construct only use generic bilinear group
operations. As a matter of notation, we will use lower case letters m,r,s, t,x,y to denote
the corresponding discrete logarithms of group elements concerning base g1 or g2.
5.4 System Model and Security Definition
A publicly verifiable RDIC scheme enables anyone to audit the integrity of the outsourced
data. We design a privacy-preserving publicly verifiable RDIC scheme with timestamp
checking to enable the TPA to check the content integrity and timestamp validation of the
outsourced data on behalf of cloud clients without leaking any information. We assume
there are three different entities namely the cloud service provider (CSP), cloud clients
and the TPA. The CSP provides data storage service and has significant computation
and storage power. The CSP might decide to hide data corruption to cloud clients for
maintaining its good reputation. However, the CSP has no intention to reveal the data to
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Figure 5.2: System Architecture of our RDIC Scheme. It consists of three parties:
clients, cloud server and TPA. The clients first send the file, auxiliary information (in-
cluding file token and authenticators) generated with the associated timestamp and the
receipt to the cloud server. When TPA conducts the audit, server has to compute a proof
with the data and information it stored. On receiving the proof, TPA checks it and out-
puts Accept if the proof can pass the verification or Reject otherwise. In the case that
the clients need to update the timestamp, the server sends the stored receipt to clients.
The clients compute the new receipt and send back to server. Finally, server regenerates
the authenticators with the new receipt.
the TPA. The cloud clients, who have large amount of data files to be stored in the cloud,
processes the outsourced data and binds it with the timestamp before uploading. The TPA
is to perform the data integrity checking on behalf of cloud clients, but it is curious about
the outsourced data during the data integrity checking process. Our scheme is illustrated
in Figure 5.2 and contains four phases.
Initial Phase: To initialize the environment, clients execute Setup and KeyGen. The
public key and system parameters are sent to all the stakeholders in the system.
Store Phase: The cloud client pre-processes the file F with the associated timestamp
using TagGen, stores the auxiliary information of the file F in the server, then deletes its
local copy. It has to store a period secret key for the update.
Audit Phase: The auditor requests a proof for a file F and sends a challenge to the server
to make sure that the server has retained the file F properly at the time of the audit. The
server will send a response that is computed by executing GenProof with the stored file F ,
the challenge, the auxiliary information, and the associated timestamp. Then, the auditor
verifies the response via VerifyProof to ensure the integrity of content and the validation
of the timestamp.
Update Phase: The client renews the contract with a new timestamp. The server sends
the old receipt to the client. Then the client computes the new receipt and sends the new
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receipt to the server. The server uses the new receipt as a token to compute the new
authenticator.
5.4.1 System Architecture
Our protocol Σ = (Setup,KeyGen,TagGen,GenProof,VerifyProof,UpdateTag, Update)
is an interactive protocol allowing a verifier to check that a prover is faithfully storing a
file with the fresh timestamp.
Setup(1λ ): Take the security parameter λ as input. It outputs system parameters pp.
KeyGen(pp): Take system parameters pp as input. It outputs the public/private key pairs
(pk,sk) and period commitment key pair (ck,tk).
TagGen(F, t,sk,ck): Take a file, the corresponding timestamp and client’s secret key
and period commitment key as input. It processes the file and outputs the file tag τ ,
authenticators {σ} and a file receipt receipt.
GenProof(pk,chal,F,{σ}, t,receipt): The probabilistic algorithm executed by CSP P .
P takes the public key pk, challenge chal from auditor, stored file F , the authenticators
{σ} and the associated timestamp t as input. It outputs a proof π .
VerifyProof(pk,chal,τ,π): The deterministic algorithm executed by verifier V . V takes
the public key pk and a file tag τ and proof π as input. It outputs 0 or 1, where 1 means
that the file is intact on the server. The protocol can be denoted as:
{0,1}←(V (pk,τ)
 P(pk,F,{σ}, t))
UpdateTag(receiptold, tnew,sk,ck): This probabilistic algorithm executed by clients
takes the file receipt receiptold , new timestamp tnew, client’s secret key sk and old pe-
riod commitment key ck as input. It produces a new receiptnew, a new file tag τ
′, a new
period commitment key ck′ and a new trapdoor key tk′.
Update(receiptnew,{σ},tk′): This deterministic algorithm executed by server takes the
new receipt receiptnew and old authenticators {σ} as input. It produces new authentica-
tors {σ ′} and stores them in the cloud.
Definition 33 (Completeness). An RDIC is complete if receiving the challenge; the prover
is possessing the file intact as it is, the verification algorithm accepts the proof made by
such prover with overwhelming probability.
5.4.2 Security Model
The soundness against server states that a server can convince the TPA that it is storing
the file is actually storing that file. By content privacy we mean that TPA learns no
information of the outsourced data during interaction with the cloud server. Similarly,
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by timestamp privacy we mean that TPA learns nothing about the timestamp from the
proof provided by the server.
Soundness against Server. To define the soundness of our scheme, the game between
adversary A and challenger C is defined as follows [59].
• Setup: C runs Setup and KeyGen to initial the environment. It gives public key pk
to A , keeping the private key sk to itself.
• Tag Query: A adaptively can request tags of any file F = (M1, · · · ,Mn) with the
associated timestamp t, C runs TagGen to compute the file tag, authenticators and
receipt (τ,{σi},receipt)← TagGen(F, t,sk,ck) and sends them back to A . At
any point, A can check the validity of the tags received.
• Proof-Verify Query: For any file on which it previously made a tag query, the
adversary can undertake executions of the auditing protocol. In these protocol exe-
cutions, C plays the part of the verifier and the adversary plays the part of the prover.
• Challenge: A chooses τ∗ that appeared in tag queries. C generates a challenge
chal = {(θi,νi)}. Then, it requests A to provide a proof on the blocks M∗θ1, · · · ,M
∗
θc
determined by chal, where 1≤ i≤ c.
• Output: Finally, A outputs a proof for the data blocks {M′
θi
},1≤ i≤ c.
We say the adversary win the game if the proof passes the verification successfully and
∃i ∈ {1, · · · ,c}, M′
θi
6= M∗
θi
.
Definition 34. The RDIC scheme has soundness if for any polynomial time adversary A
attacking the RDIC scheme, the probability of A winning the game is negligible.
Indistinguishable Content Privacy against TPA We want to ensure that the TPA cannot
distinguish which of the file content is used to generate the proof in the audit phase. The
content indistinguishable privacy of an RDIC scheme is defined via the game between
a challenger C (i.e., the cloud server) and an adversary A (i.e., the TPA or verifier) as
follows [28].
• Setup: C runs Setup and KeyGen to initial the environment. It gives public key to
A , keeping the private key to itself.
• Tag Query: A can request file tag for particular files. In each query, A can choose
a file F to be stored and C generates the file tag, the authenticators and the receipt
for the file. Only the file tag is returned to A .
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• Audit Query: In this phase, A can request the proof for polynomial times. For
each query, A uses the file tag τ of file F generated in Tag Query and randomly
chooses the chal, and then asks for the proof from C . C generates the proof π and
sends π to A .
• Challenge: A provides two files (F0,F1) and a timestamp t. C randomly chooses
a file Fb, b ∈ {0,1} from (F0,F1) and runs TagGen on Fb and t. It sends the tag τb
to A . On receiving τb, A sends a challenge chal to C . C computes πb and sends
it to A .
• Guess: At the end of the game, A outputs a guess b′ on the b.
We say A wins the game if A ’s guess b′ = b.
Definition 35. The RDIC possesses the content privacy if for any polynomial time adver-
saries A attacking the RDIC scheme, the advantage of A distinguishing two files (F0,F1)
from the given proof πb is negligible.
Indistinguishable Timestamp Privacy against TPA We want to ensure that the TPA
cannot distinguish which of the timestamp is associated with the file of the proof in the
audit phase. The timestamp indistinguishable privacy of an RDIC scheme is similar to the
indistinguishable content privacy, defined as follows [28].
• Setup: C runs Setup and KeyGen to initial the environment. It gives public key to
A , keeping the private key to itself.
• Tag Query: same as in the content privacy game.
• Audit Query: same as in the content privacy game.
• Challenge: C randomly chooses a timestamp tb from (t0, t1), which are provided
together with a file F by A , and runs TagGen on the file F with the timestamp tb.
It sends τ to A . On receiving τ , A sends a challenge to C to obtain πb.
• Guess: At the end of the game, A outputs a guess b′ on the b.
We say A wins the game if A ’s guess b′ = b.
Definition 36. The RDIC possesses the timestamp privacy if for any polynomial time
adversaries A attacking the RDIC scheme, the advantage of A distinguishing two times-
tamp (t0, t1) from the given proof πb is negligible.
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5.5 Construction
We recall the building blocks of our construction and give a framework for our proposed
scheme. As mentioned before, we consider the structure-preserving signatures with the
linear homomorphic property to construct the homomorphic authenticator in our scheme.
Notation: in this part, we represent the structure-preserving signature as SPS, the Groth-
Sahai proof system as GS, the commitment scheme as COM, the digital signature as Sig
and the range proof system as RPS.
Our proposed RDIC scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ ): Take the security parameter as input. It runs SPS.Setup(1λ ), GS.Setup
(1λ ) and COM.Setup(1λ ) and chooses an EU-CMA signature scheme Sig such as
the BLS short signature [14]. Finally, it outputs the system parameters pp including
all public parameters in SPS, GS, RPS and COM.
• KeyGen(pp): Take the system parameters as input. It runs SPS.KeyGen(pp) and
Sig.KeyGen(pp) to generate pk= (SPS.vk,Sig.vk),sk= (SPS.sk,Sig.sk). It runs
COM.KeyGen(pp) to generate a period commitment key and trapdoor key as (COM.
ck,COM.tk). It outputs the public/private key pair (pk,sk) and the period commit-
ment key pair (COM.ck,COM.tk).
• TagGen(F, t,sk,COM.ck): Take the file, timestamp, client’s private key and the
period commitment key as input. It runs SPS.Sign(F,sk, t,COM.ck) to generate
the authenticators σ . Then client generates the file tag as τ = τ0||SigSig.sk(τ0),
where τ0 contains the file name and some auxiliary information. It computes the file
receipt receipt = receipt0||SigSig.sk(receipt0) where receipt0 is computed
with COM.ck and t. It outputs the file tag τ , authenticators {σ} and the file receipt
receipt.
• GenProof(pk,chal,F,{σ}, t,receipt): Take the public key, the challenge set, the
file, authenticators, timestamp and file receipt as input. It runs SPS.SigAggr(chal,σ)
to obtain the aggregated value ζ and SPS.MsgAggr (chal,F) to obtain a set of ag-
gregated message blocks {µ}. It then runs GS.Prove(pp,w) using the outputs of
SPS.SigAggr and SPS.MsgAggr as the witness w, generates a proof with witness in-
distinguishability. By using the file receipt, it runs RPS to generate a non-interactive
range proof on the timestamp to validate the freshness of timestamp.
• VerifyProof(pk,chal,τ,π): Take the public key, the challenge set, the file tag and
the proof generated with GenProof as input. It runs GS.Verify(pp,x,π) to verify the
file integrity and range proof to ensure the freshness of timestamp, respectively.
• UpdateTag(receiptold, tnew,sk,COM.ck): Take the original receipt receiptold ,
the new timestamp, client’s private key and the period commitment key as input.
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It randomly chooses the new period commitment key COM.ck′ and computes its
trapdoor key COM.tk′, the new receipt and new file tag.
• Update(receiptnew,{σ},COM.tk′): Take the new receipt receiptnew and old au-
thenticators {σ} as input. It runs SPS.Rand(σ ,r) to update the authenticators,
where r is from the new receipt. It outputs the new authenticators {σ ′} if the auxil-
iary information containing timestamp is valid and consistent with COM.tk′.
Our RDIC scheme consists of seven algorithms that are Ω = (Setup,KeyGen,TagGen,
GenProof,VerifyProof,UpdateTag,Update). Below we first present the basic scheme
without GS or range proof.
Setup(1λ ). It takes the security parameter λ and outputs some public parameters that
are a finite field Zp, a tuple of bilinear groups (G1,G2,GT ) with the prime order p and
paring e : G1×G2→ GT . g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 are chosen as the generators of G1 and G2,
respectively. It decides an existentially unforgeable signature scheme Sig such as BLS
[13] to generate file tags and a cryptographic hash function H : {0,1}∗ → Zp. Then it
publishes these public parameters pp to all parties in the environment.
KeyGen(pp). It takes system parameters pp. Then it outputs a pair of public/private
key pk= (X1,X2, · · · ,Xs,Y,spk),sk= (x1,x2, · · · ,xs,y,ssk), where X j = g
x j
1 , Y = g
y
2 and
(spk,ssk) is the key pair of the signature scheme. Also, it generates a period commitment
key ck= z,z∈Zp and a period trapdoor key tk=(h1,h2), where h1 = gz1,h2 = g
z
2. It sends
the public key and trapdoor key to the public.
TagGen(F, t,sk,ck). It takes the file F to be stored in the cloud, timestamp t, client’s sk
and the period commitment key ck. Then it breaks F into n blocks, where Mi denotes the
i-th block. For the data block Mi, there are s sectors as {Mi j}. It chooses a random file
name f name from a sufficiently large domain. It computes R= gzt+r1 , t,r∈Zp. It sends the
receipt for the further update that receipt= receipt0||Sigssk(receipt0),receipt0 =
(r,null,gr1). Then it computes the tag denoted as τ = τ0||Sigssk(τ0), where τ0 = f name||n||R.
Also, it computes σi as the authenticator for block Mi
σi = (
s
∏
j=1
Mx ji j ·Y
x1 ·gH( f name||i)2 )
1
tz+r .
The server stores (F,τ,{σi},receipt).
On receiving the data from clients, the server can check the consistency of the times-
tamp binding in all the data from clients if the information provided by clients caters to
the following conditions
e(R,g2) = e(h1,g2)te(gr1,g2).
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GenProof(pk,chal,F,{σi}, t,receipt). The prover receives the c-element set {θi,νi} to
be challenged, denoted as chal, where θi ∈ I, where I is the indices set of blocks in file F
and νi is a random prime in Zp. Using the stored σi, it computes a proof π = (ζ ,{µ j}).
ζ =
c
∏
i=1
σ
νi
θi
,
µ j =
c
∏
i=1
Mνi
θi, j
, 1≤ j ≤ s.
Remark: for the purpose of proving the validation of timestamp, we adopt the range
proof system to prove the timestamp in a specific range. The details will be given in the
Timeliness section. For the purpose of providing IND-privacy, we adopt the GS proof
system to hide the content and timestamp of the outsourced data during the audit.
VerifyProof(pk,chal,τ,π). The verifier verifies the validity of τ by spk and
e(R,ζ ) =
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
It outputs 1 if all conditions are held. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
UpdateTag(receipt, t ′,sk,ck). The client uses the new timestamp t ′ and receives the
old receipt receipt= (r,null/∆′,gr1). Then it computes ∆
′ = tz+rt ′z′+r′ , r
′,z′ ∈ Zp where z′
as the new period commitment key ck′ and h′1 = g
z′
1 ,h
′
2 = g
z′
2 as the commitment trapdoor
key tk′. The client gets the new receipt receipt′ = (r′,∆′,gr
′
1 ) and computes R
′ = R
1
∆′
and new file tag τ ′= τ ′0||Sigssk(τ ′0),τ ′0 = f name||n||R′. It sends the new receipt receipt′,
the new trapdoor key tk′ and file tag τ ′ to the server.
Update(receipt′,{σi},tk′). The server receives receipt′ = (r′,∆′,gr
′
1 ), authenticators
{σi} and the new commitment trapdoor key tk′. The server computes σ ′i = σ∆
′
i . The
server stores the new authenticators {σ ′i},1≤ i≤ n.
It is easy to check the consistency of the timestamp as follows
e(h′1,g2) = e(g1,h
′
2)∧ e(R′,g2) = e(g1,g2)t
′
e(gr
′
1 ,h
′
2).
Verifiability. The content of the outsourced file is verifiable in terms of the verification
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algorithm. The correctness of the above verification equation is clear.
e(R,ζ ) = e(gtz+r1 ,
c
∏
i=1
σ
νi
θi
)
= e(g1,
c
∏
i=1
(
s
∏
j=1
Mx jνi
θi, j
·gyx1νi2 ·g
H( f name||θi)νi
2 ))
=
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi
Timeliness. The timestamp of the outsourced file is verifiable by range proof system [15].
It is to prove that the timestamp t, which indicates the expiry time of the data storage, is
greater than the current time. Therefore, it ensures the timestamp is fresh. To ensure that
P possesses the up-to-date authenticators, they will conduct the range proof to verify
the claimed timestamp t is in the range [t1,2l) where t1 is the current time and 2l is the
maximum value of the time.
• In the above basic construction, R is a commitment over the timestamp t as R =
ht1g
r
1. CSP computes the commitment value with the current timestamp t1 and the
randomness r1 as R1 = h
t1
1 g
r1
1 . CSP then sends (t1,g
r1
1 ) to the TPA. Note that R1 is
verifiable with (t1,g
r1
1 ).
• Following the range proof system, CSP uses ∆R = RR1 = g
∆r
1 h
∆t
1 where ∆r = r− r1
as the commitment of ∆t = t− t1 and proves to TPA that ∆t ∈ [0,2l) by following
the scheme as described in Section 5.3.1.
Indistinguishable Privacy. In order to achieve the IND-privacy, we adopt the Witness
Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge technique proposed by Groth and Sahai. The server
will provide (ζ ,{µ j}),1≤ j ≤ s that the equation holds as follows:
e(R,ζ ) =
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
We will treat (ζ ,{µ j}) as the witness and apply the Groth-Sahai proof system. As for the
details of the proof, please refer to [40].
As an example, we set s = 1 to show how Groth-Sahai proof system works on our basic
scheme. When applying the Groth–Sahai proof system, rewrite equation as follows:
e(R,ζ )e(X1,µ−1) =
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
The client computes an additional commitment key~u = (u1,u2) of the form
u1 = (u11,u12) = (u,uα), u2 = (u21,u22) = (uβ ,uβα),
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where u ∈G2.
To hide (ζ ,µ), the CSP computes the commitments c = (c1,c2) as
c1 = (u
r11
11 u
r12
21 ,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 ζ ), c2 = (u
r21
11 u
r22
21 ,u
r21
12 u
r22
22 µ),
where r11,r12,r21,r22 are randomly chosen from Zp. The CSP also computes π =(π1,π2),
where
π1 = (1,Rr11X
−r21
1 ),
π2 = (1,Rr12X
−r22
1 ).
Finally, (c,π) are sent to TPA instead of (ζ ,µ).
To verify the proof, TPA performs some transformations on the verification equation.
• First, we define ? operation: ~x?~y = F (x1,y1)F (x2,y2), where
F (x1,y2) =
[
e(x11,y21) e(x11,y22)
e(x12,y21) e(x22,y22)
]
• Set
L =
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi
= e(X1,Y )∑
c
i=1 νie(g1,g2)∑
c
i=1 H( f name||θi)νi.
It implies that e(R,ζ )e(X1,µ−1) = L, by the verification equation.
• Set public parameters including the public key X1 and R: set k = (k1,k2), where
k1 = (1,R),k2 = (1,X−11 ).
The TPA performs the verification via the equation that
L(π ?u>) = k ? c>.
The left side and right side are computed as follows.
LS = L · (π ?u>)
= L · e(Rr11X−r211 ,u11)e(R
r11X−r211 ,u12)e(R
r12X−r221 ,u21)e(R
r12X−r221 ,u22)
= L · e(R,ur11+r12β11 )e(R,u
r11+r12β
12 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21+r22β
11 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21+r22β
12 )
= L · e(R,ur1111 u
r12
21 )e(R,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
11 u
r22
21 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
12 u
r22
22 )
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RS = k ? c>
= e(R,ur1111 u
r12
21 )e(R,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 ζ )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
11 u
r22
21 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
12 u
r22
22 µ)
= e(R,ζ )e(X−11 ,µ)e(R,u
r11
11 u
r12
21 )e(R,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
11 u
r22
21 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r21
12 u
r22
22 )
If LS = RS, TPA return True to show that the data is intact as it is storing. Otherwise,
False.
In general case, suppose that each data block contains s sectors, we rewrite equation as
follows:
e(R,ζ )
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ−1j ) =
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
The client computes an additional commitment key~u = (u1,u2) of the form
u1 = (u11,u12) = (u,uα), u2 = (u21,u22) = (uβ ,uβα),
where u ∈G2.
To hide (ζ ,{µ j}), the CSP computes the commitments c = (c0,c1, · · · ,cs) as
c0 = (u
r01
11 u
r02
21 ,u
r01
12 u
r02
22 ζ ),
c1 = (u
r11
11 u
r12
21 ,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 µ1),
· · ·
cs = (u
rs1
11 u
rs2
21 ,u
rs1
12 u
rs2
22 µs)
where r01,r02,r11,r12, · · · ,rs1,rs2 are randomly chosen from Zp. The CSP also computes
π = (π0,π1, · · · ,πs), where
π0 = (1,Rr01X
−r11
1 · · ·X
−rs1
s ),
π1 = (1,Rr02X
−r12
1 · · ·X
−rs2
s )
Finally, (c,π) are sent to TPA instead of (ζ ,{µ j}.
To verify the proof, TPA performs some transformations on the verification equation.
• First, we define ? operation: ~x?~y = F (x1,y1)F (x2,y2), where
F (x1,y2) =
[
e(x11,y21) e(x11,y22)
e(x12,y21) e(x22,y22)
]
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• Set
L =
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi
= e(X1,Y )∑
c
i=1 νie(g1,g2)∑
c
i=1 H( f name||θi)νi.
It implies that e(R,ζ )∏sj=1 e(X1,µ
−1
j ) = L, by the verification equation.
• Set public parameters including the public key X1 and R: set k = (k0,k1, · · · ,ks),
where k0 = (1,R),k1 = (1,X−11 ), · · · ,ks = (1,X−1s ).
The TPA performs the verification via the equation that
L(π ?u>) = k ? c>.
The left side and right side are computed as follows.
LS = L · (π ?u>)
= L · e(Rr01X−r111 · · ·X
−rs1
s ,u11)e(R
r01X−r111 · · ·X
−rs1
s ,u12)e(R
r02X−r121 · · ·X
−rs2
s ,u21)
e(Rr02X−r121 · · ·X
−rs2
s ,u22)
= L · e(R,ur0111 u
r02
21 )e(R,u
r01
12 u
r02
22 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r11
11 u
r12
21 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 ) · · ·e(X
−1
s ,u
rs1
11 u
rs2
21 )
e(X−1s ,u
rs1
12 u
rs2
22 )
RS = k ? c>
= e(R,ur0111 u
r02
21 )e(R,u
r01
12 u
r02
22 ζ )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r11
11 u
r12
21 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 µ1) · · ·e(X
−1
s ,u
rs1
11 u
rs2
21 )
e(X−1s ,u
rs1
12 u
rs2
22 µs)
= e(R,ζ )e(X−11 ,µ1) · · ·e(X
−1
1 ,µs)e(R,u
r01
11 u
r02
21 )e(R,u
r01
12 u
r02
22 )e(X
−1
1 ,u
r11
11 u
r12
21 )
e(X−11 ,u
r11
12 u
r12
22 ) · · ·e(X
−1
s ,u
rs1
11 u
rs2
21 )e(X
−1
s ,u
rs1
12 u
rs2
22 )
If LS = RS, TPA returns True to show that the data is intact as it is storing. Otherwise,
False.
5.6 Security Analysis
Theorem 6. If the signature scheme in our scheme is existentially unforgeable and the
GS proof system is sound, then there is no PPT adversary that can break the soundness of
our RDIC scheme in the generic group model.
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Below we first prove that our basic RDIC scheme is sound in the generic group model,
that is, the prover can only generate a valid proof by using the correct file blocks and
authenticators. The proof is done by a sequence of games [63] between a simulator B
and the adversary A .
Game 0. A interacts with B in the originally soundness game as defined in section 5.4.2.
Game 1. This game is the same as Game 0 expect that if A submits a file tag that is valid
but not generated by B, B declares failure and aborts. It implies that A can break the
unforgeability of the deployed signature scheme.
Game 2. Game 2 is the same as Game 1, except that if A outputs a proof that makes
VerifyProof accept in the challenge instance but the aggregated value ζ in the proof is not
equal to ∏(θk,νk)∈Q σ
νk
θk
, where Q is the challenge set issued by B, B declares failure and
aborts.
Lemma 6. The difference in success probabilities between Game 0 and Game 1 is negli-
gible if the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
Proof. Suppose that in the game A submits a tag on a file that is not generated by B.
In this case, A breaks the underlying signature scheme in TagGen. According to the
difference lemma, we have that
|AdvGame0A −Adv
Game1
A | ≤ εSig.
Lemma 7. The difference in success probabilities between Game 1 and Game 2 is negli-
gible in generic bilinear groups.
Proof. We show that the adversary A is impossible to construct ζ 6= ∏(θi,νi)∈Q σ
νi
θi
and
satisfy the following equation:
e(R,ζ ) =
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
The group elements in pk are g1,X1,X2, · · · ,Xs ∈ G1 and g2,Y ∈ G2 with corresponding
discrete logarithms 1,x1,x2, · · · ,xs and 1,y. On a tag query from A , B chooses t from the
time space and z,r ∈ Zp and generate R with discrete logarithm t̂ = tz+ r. For each Mi j
with discrete logarithm {mi j}, B responds with a authenticator σi with discrete logarithm
logσi =
(∑sj=1 x jmi j + x1y+ fi)
t̂
where fi ∈ Zp denotes H( f name||i).
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In the Proof-Verify queries, on a challenge Qi from the simulator, the generic adversary
responds with a proof (ζ ,{µ j}) with discrete logarithms
logζ =
c
∑
k=1
νk
∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j + x1y+ fθk
t̂
,
log µ j =
c
∑
k=1
νkmθk j.
Suppose in the challenge phase, the adversary outputs a proof (ζ ,{µ}) whose discrete
logarithms are linear combinations of 1,y, t̂,{σ j},{ζ j},{µ j}, i.e.,
logζ = ι + ιyy+ ιrt̂ +
q
∑
j=1
ισ jσ j +
q
∑
j=1
ιζ jζ j
+
q
∑
j=1
ιµ j µ j
log µ = ρ +ρyy+ρrt̂ +
q
∑
j=1
ρσ jσ j +
q
∑
j=1
ρζ jζ j
+
q
∑
j=1
ρµ j µ j
We will show that our scheme is sound, i.e., an adversary cannot construct a proof on a file
to satisfy the verification equation, unless it uses the correct file blocks and authenticators.
Given the verification equation
e(R,ζ ) =
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi
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we can write the discrete logarithms on left side (LS) and right side (RS) as follows.
LS = t̂(ι + ιyy+ ιrt̂ +∑
q
1 ισ jσ j +∑
q
1 ιζ jζ j +∑
q
1 ιµ j µ j).
= t̂(ι + ιyy+ ιrt̂ +∑
q
1 ισ j
∑
s
j=1 x jmi j+x1y+ fi
t̂
+∑
q
1 ιζ j ∑
c
k=1 νk
∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j+x1y+ fθk
t̂ +∑
q
1 ιµ j µ j)
= (ι t̂ + ιyyt̂ + ιrt̂2 +∑
q
1 ισ j(∑
s
j=1 x jmi j + x1y+ fi)
+∑
q
1 ιζ j ∑
c
k=1 νk(∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j + x1y+ fθk)+∑
q
1 ιµ j µ jt̂)
RS = ∑sj=1 x j(ρ +ρyy+ρrt̂ +∑
q
1 ρσ jσ j +∑
q
1 ρζ jζ j +∑
q
1 ρµ j µ j)
+∏cj=1 ν j(x1y+ fθ j)
= ∑sj=1 x j(ρ +ρyy+ρrt̂ +∑
q
1 ρσ j
∑
s
j=1 x jmi j+x1y+ fi
t̂
+∑
q
1 ρζ j ∑
c
k=1 νk
∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j+x1y+ fθk
t̂ +∑
q
1 ρµ j µ j)+∑
c
k=1 νk( j(x1y+ fθk)
= ∑sj=1(ρx j +ρyyx j +ρrt̂x j +∑
q
1 x jρσ j
∑
s
j=1 x jmi j+x1y+ fi
t̂
+∑
q
1 x jρζ j ∑
c
k=1 νk
∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j+x1y+ fθk
t̂ +∑
q
1 ρµ jx jµ j)+∑
c
k=1 νk(x1y+ fθk)
ι = 0 t̂
ιy = 0 yt̂
ιr = 0 t̂2
ισ j = 0 ∑
s
j=1 x jmi j
ιζ j 6= 0 ∑
c
k=1 νk ∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j
ισ j + ιζ j ∑
c
k=1 νk 6= 0 x1y
ισ j = 0 fi
ιζ j 6= 0 ∑
c
k=1 νk fθk
∑
q
1 ιµ j µ jt̂
ρ = 0 ∑sj=1 x j
ρy = 0 ∑sj=1 yx j
ρr = 0 ∑sj=1 t̂x j
ρσ j = 0 x j
∑
s
j=1 x jmi j+x1y+ fi
t̂
ρζ j = 0 x j ∑
c
k=1 νk
∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j+x1y+ fθk
t̂
ρµ j 6= 0 ∑sj=1 x jµ j
1 ∑ck=1 νk(x1y+ fθk)

According to the coefficient list above, ∑ck=1 νk ∑
s
j=1 x jmθk j is corresponding to x jµ j,
which means µ j = ∑ck=1 νkmθk j. x1y and fθk are both in the left and right side with
non-zero coefficient. The coefficient on both sides should be equal. It means that ζ =
∏(θ j,ν j)∈Q σ
ν j
θ j
. Hence, the proof in the challenge phase must be generated honestly in
order to pass the verification.
Therefore, we can conclude that the basic scheme is sound.
Now we consider the soundness of the full RDIC scheme where the Groth-Sahai proof
system is employed. Because of the soundness of the Groth-Sahai proof system, it is
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guaranteed that the witness (ζ ,{µ j}) used by the prover to generate the proof must satisfy
the equation
e(R,ζ ) =
s
∏
j=1
e(X j,µ j)
c
∏
i=1
(e(X1,Y )e(g1,g2)H( f name||θi))νi.
Then the soundness of the full RDIC scheme follows that of the basic scheme.
Theorem 7. There is no PPT adversary against the content privacy of our scheme if
Groth-Sahai proof system is witness indistinguishable.
Proof Sketch. We show that if there exists an adversary A who can break the content
privacy of the RDIC scheme, we can construct another algorithm B to break the witness
indistinguishability of the Groth-Sahai proof system. Note that in the witness indistin-
guishability game, B is allowed to know the witnesses and aims to find out the specific
witness used in a valid proof generated by its challenger.
B receives the system parameters from its challenger and simulates the Tag queries and
Audit queries for A as usual. In Challenge phase, B sets a file name f name∗ and R∗ =
gzt+r1 and responds the file tag to A by running TagGen such that τ
∗ = (τ∗0 ,Sigssk(τ
∗
0 )),
where τ0 = f name∗||n||R∗. B then generates two sets of authenticators {σ}0 and {σ}1
for F0 and F1, respectively.
When B receives the challenge from A , B then passes the same challenge to its chal-
lenger in the witness indistinguishability game and receives a proof πb. B passes the proof
πb to A and outputs whatever A outputs. If A can guesses the value of b correctly, B
can win the witness indistinguishability game of the Groth-Sahai proof system.
Theorem 8. The timestamp privacy of our scheme holds if the Pederson commitment is
perfectly hiding, the range proof is zero-knowledge and the Groth-Sahai proof system is
witness indistinguishable.
Proof Sketch. Let Game 0 denotes the original timestamp privacy game. We can create
a sequence of games as follows:
Game 1: the simulator simulates the range proof using the zero-knowledge simulator.
Due to the zero-knowledge property, Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 0.
Game 2: the simulator replaces tb by a random t in the valid range. Since the Pederson
commitment is perfectly hiding, and the Groth-Sahai proof system is witness indistin-
guishable, Game 2 is indistinguishable from Game 1.
Finally, in Game 2, it is obvious that the adversary has no advantage since the game
is independent from t0 and t1, which in turn shows that the adversary only has negligible
advantage in Game 0.
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5.7 Experimental Performance
5.7.1 Theoretical Comparison
We summarize the computation cost of our scheme and comparison among our scheme,
Wang et al.’s scheme [73] and Fan et al.’s scheme [28] over efficiency and functionality.
In the table, s is the number of the sectors of a file block and c is the size of the challenge
set. The cost of the file tag and authenticator generation is not counted as they are done
just once before a file is uploaded.
Since [73] and [28] both treat 1 data block with only 1 sector. In our experiments, our
scheme is implemented by setting 1 data block contains 1 sector.
Computation. On Gi, i ∈ {1,2,T}, bilinear pairings P and exponentiation Ei contribute
most computation cost. The other operations are much faster, such as hash function,
the operations on finite fields and multiplication on group elements etc. Thus, we only
consider bilinear pairings on bilinear groups and exponentiations on Gi, i ∈ {1,2,T}. The
computation cost comparison are as follows Table 5.1.
In audit phase, the server generates a proof by running GenProof which contains 2c
exponentiation on G2. In order to enhance the privacy during the audit, our scheme adds
the additional Groth-Sahai proof system. In our scheme, the server provides a GS proof
by running 4 exponentiation on G1 and 4 exponentiation on G2.
Later, TPA gets the proof and verifies the proof by calculating 8 pairing and 2 expo-
nentiation on GT .
Table 5.1: Comparison of Computation and Functionality
Scheme GenProof VerifyProof Proof Size Timestamp
Wang [73] cE1 +1ET 2P+(c+2)E1 1G1 +1GT +1Zp ×
Fan [28] (c+4)E1 +4E2 9P+ c∗E1 4G1 +4G2 ×
Ours 4E1 +(2c+4)E2 8P+2ET 4G1 +4G2
√
Communication. In the audit protocol, the verifier sends a challenge Q to the CSP,
where Q = {(θi,νi)} denotes the challenge set. νi are randomly chosen in Zp, of which
the element is 160-bit length. In this case, the communication cost is of binary length
c(|θi|+160).
In the response of our scheme, to protect the privacy of (ζ ,{µ j}), the response contains
4 elements in G1 which is 160-bit length, 4 elements in G2 which is 320-bit lengtha, and
the file tag τ .
The communication cost of the response is of binary length 1920 + |τ| during our
scheme.
aType F internals. URL: https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/manual/ch08s08.html.
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Storage. Regarding the storage cost, since our scheme is publicly verifiable, both the data
and auxiliary information are stored on the CSP. The client needs to store nothing in this
context. The storage overhead is similar to the previous schemes in [73, 28, 86] in terms
of the file tag and authenticators of each data block. Additionally, our scheme requires
to store a receipt at the server, which includes 3 group elements and a corresponding
signature.
5.7.2 Experimental Comparison
We implement the prototype of our scheme and evaluate the time cost at audit phase. The
implementation was conducted on a notebook with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5, 8 GB and 1867
MHz DDR3. We use Java 1.8 and JPBC to implement the cryptographic algorithm. The
implementation is set up with type f elliptic curve with 80-bit security. Our experiments
determine the computation overheads of the following algorithms involved in our scheme,
namely GenProof and VerifyProof.
In our experiments, we set each data block to contain just one sector, which has 320
bits. We change the number of the sampling blocks in the challenge from 0 to 300,
and the computation cost grows linearly as the verifier requests more sampling blocks.
To support timestamp checking and updating as shown in Table 5.1, we construct the
authenticator with a novel structure, which adopts the structure-preserving signature with
linear homomorphism and re-randomization. Therefore, the proof generation takes more
computation comparing to [73] and [28]. However, the time cost of verification in our
scheme keeps constant. When proof generates with more data blocks, the TPA verifies
the proof more efficiently, comparing to [28] and [73]. In both of [28] and [73], the time
cost of verification linearly increases.
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Figure 5.3: Time Cost of GenProof
Timestamp Validation. The efficiency of the validation on timestamp depends on the
efficiency of the range proof system we deployed during the audit [56]. The timestamp t
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Figure 5.4: Time Cost of VerifyProof
is in in the finite field Zp, which is of 160-bit length. We denote each bit of t as ti,1≤ i≤
160. The commitment on ti is denoted as ci.
The prover conducts 3 exponentiation and 1 multiplication on ti . Therefore, the total
computation cost on the prover side is 480 exponentiation, 160 multiplication.
The verifier of our deployed range proof conducts 2 exponentiation and 2 multiplica-
tion on ci. The verification equation ∏n−1i=0 L
i
0 = g
s ·∏n−1i=0 Pi0
ci0 mentioned in ?? contains
160 exponentiation, 160 multiplication on the right side and 159 multiplication on the left
side. Additionally, to ensure that the commitment are honestly derived from the value
to be committed, the commitment on t contains 2 exponentiation and 2 multiplication.
Therefore, the total computation cost on verifier side is 482 exponentiation, 481 multipli-
cation.
Detection Rate. Suppose the CSP hosts a n-block file, out of which x blocks are cor-
rupted. The verifier checks the integrity of the entire file containing n blocks by randomly
sampling c different blocks. In the experiment, we show successful detection probabilities
for 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% corruption rates, respectively. Let Px denote the detection rate
Px = 1− (n− x)(n−1− x) · · ·(n− c+1− x)
n(n−1) · · ·(n− c+1)
.
When the corruption rate is of 1%, generating a proof with 400 blocks from a file with
500 blocks can detect such corruption with 99.9% probability. The probability will be
declined to 99.4% when such file contains 5000 blocks.
When the corruption rate is of 5%, generating a proof with 380 blocks from a 500-
block file provides the detection rate close to 1. When the file contains 1000 blocks, the
detection rate of sampling 100 blocks is close to 99.4%, similar as sampling 400 blocks
from a 500-block file. When sampling 80 blocks from a 5000-block file, the detection
rate is 98.4%.
When the corruption rate is of 10%, to achieve the detection rate close to 1, the proof
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should contain 260 blocks, 300 blocks and 360 blocks for the 500-block file, 1000-block
file and 5000-block file, respectively.
When the corruption rate is of 20%, to achieve the detection rate close to 1, the proof
should contain 140 blocks, 160 blocks and 180 blocks for the 500-block file, 1000-block
file and 5000-block file.
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5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a full-fledged RDIC scheme which supports the timestamp
update and zero-knowledge checking over the timestamp in the meanwhile. We provide
a framework and the corresponding construction of the desired RDIC scheme. By the
formal security analysis and experimental performance analysis, we can conclude that the
security of our proposed scheme is strong enough in the real-world application and the
performance is reasonable as it providing a strong security guarantee.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
Data integrity and privacy have been a primary concern to the cloud user for cloud stor-
age. In this thesis, we propose several provable privacy-preserving cryptographic so-
lutions such as identity-based encryption with equality test and proof of storage. Our
contributions are not only in the theoretical research but in real-world applications. The
contributions can be summarized as follows.
1. The identity-based encryption with equality test is to tell whether two ciphertexts
are generated with the same content or not. We propose a novel identity-based
equality test scheme (IBEET) to prevent an HBC server from testing the embedded
data in the target ciphertext on its guess, which is defined as the insider attack. We
also define a novel security model, as Weak-IND-ID-CCA (W-IND-ID-CCA), for
the confidentiality of IBEET.
2. Proof of storage (PoS) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a party to verify that
the prover stores a file intact. We first present a PoR protocol that allows a user to
verify the integrity of data and its timestamp and ensures retrievability of the data
upon successful auditing. Then, we propose a privacy-preserving public auditing
protocol in which a TPA can efficiently verify integrity of outsourced data and the
timestamp while no information on the content or the timestamp is leaked to the
TPA. We show that both protocols are sound, i.e., they can detect any modification
or absence of the outsourced data with overwhelming probability. It is especially
suited to impel the cloud storage like a public utility such as water, gas, or electric-
ity.
3. In a practical scenario where a user wishes to change the duration of the contract
by changing the binding timestamp of the contract at any time, the client and cloud
server are aiming to accomplish the change by less cost on computation and com-
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munication. Therefore, we propose an RDIC scheme to simultaneously check the
data content and storage duration represented by an updatable timestamp via the
third-party auditor (TPA). Also, our proposed scheme achieves indistinguishable
privacy (IND-privacy) against TPA for both data content and timestamp. To bind the
content and timestamp in the authenticator and support efficient timestamp update,
we construct the authenticator with the randomizable structure-preserving signature
(SPS). Additionally, we utilize the Groth-Sahai proof and range proof to provide the
IND-privacy and guarantee the timestamp validation in the auditing phase.
6.2 Future Work
The future work of the research topic can be in the following range:
1. Privacy-preserving approaches for Internet-of-Things. The Internet-of-Things as a
new trend of research has attracted huge attention for the challenges on its security
and privacy issues. The privacy-preserving applications in cloud will meet the new
challenge when they are applied to IoT systems with limits on computation and
communication. Thus, we plan to extend the approaches presented in this thesis to
a server/edge-aided setting to cope the constrains of IoT devices.
2. Privacy-preserving solutions for Blockchain. The blockchain is a recently hot re-
search topic. The privacy issue is the main concern for the user of blockchain-based
applications since the blockchain is published to the public. The privacy-preserving
approaches presented in this thesis are in a centralised structure. How to extend the
approaches to a decentralised structure for their adoption in blockchain is one of
our future works.
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